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Abstract 
True Citizens of Bahrain: Discourse on Bahraini Identity since the Arab 
Spring 
Amy Katherine Stoller, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
Supervisor:  Kamran Aghaie 
When Bahrain's uprising began in February 2011, the opposition presented united front. 
By the time of the national dialogue a year later, however, it had fractured both along and 
within sectarian lines. The government’s inconsistent response to the uprising also 
demonstrated tensions within Bahrain’s royal family. An analysis of discourse on the 
national dialogue, terrorism and violence, expatriates, and the Gulf Union plan revealed 
that Bahrain's political factions were divided by their conceptions of Bahraini identity and 
citizenship. Bahrain was a young nation and questions of identity were still very much 
under debate. This work drew on newspaper opinion pieces, official statements published 
by political groups, and posters and videos they posted on social media to explain the 




these debates continued to divide Sunni and Shi’i groups within the opposition as well as 
the moderate and conservative factions within the royal family. Finally, I considered how 
these groups used their varying conceptions of Bahraini citizenship to justify their tactics 
in pursuing or attempting to quash the uprising. Even as each group demanded rights for 
citizens, they disagreed on what citizenship meant. Similarly, denying that their opponents 
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When protests in Bahrain began on February 14, 2011, the demonstrators 
represented a cross-section of Bahraini society, including both Sunnis and Shi’is. A 
common slogan on signs and banners at the time was “No Shiites, no Sunnis, only 
Bahrainis.”1 Parliamentarians protested at the Pearl Roundabout alongside unemployed 
rural youth. The scene resembled those in Cairo, Benghazi, and Tunis in the early days of 
other “Arab Spring” uprisings. This unity did not last. The massive popular uprising was 
scattered by a government crackdown, which Matthiesen and others believe targeted Sunni 
protesters- particularly those with “No Shiites, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis” banners- as a 
way of detaching them from their Shi’i compatriots.2 More fundamentally, many Sunnis 
were disturbed by what they saw as the increasingly Islamist rhetoric of the Shi’i 
protesters.3  
By February 2013 when members of the officially sanctioned opposition groups 
were invited to a “national dialogue” to discuss their grievances with each other and 
government representatives, the divisions within the opposition were obvious. What caused 
this division? Most of the existing literature attributed this splintering of the Bahraini 
                                                          
1 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences.," 
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (May 29, 2013), accessed November 
23, 2013, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.be. 
2 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn't (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 58-59. 
3 Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013.  
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opposition to the government’s use of sectarianism to drive a wedge between factions of 
the reform movement. In this view, the government sought to limit the uprising to a Shi’i 
-only movement that could be more easily discredited as an Iranian plot. Marc Lynch and 
Toby Matthiesen have also cited “sectarian entrepreneurs” within the various political 
factions, who played on sectarian sentiment to gain power for themselves.4 Careful 
manipulation of sectarian distrust and resentment helped to explain the growing hostility 
between Sunnis and Shi’is in Bahrain, and it remains the primary frame both outside 
observers and Bahrainis use to explain the conflict. It does not, however, explain the 
divisions within Shi’i and Sunni groups or within the royal family. These divisions have 
made it impossible to resolve the conflict in Bahrain as neither religious group can present 
a united front. The goal of this paper is to discover the issues that divide these groups and 
examine how their differing viewpoints have manifested themselves in the discourse on 
the uprising 
This paper analyzes discourse from opinion pieces published between January 2012 
and December 2013 in Bahrain’s five newspapers and two the opposition news websites. 
It also examines statements published by Bahrain’s political groups on their website and 
Facebook pages as well as protest posters and videos published by the February 14 Youth 
                                                          
4 Marc Lynch, "The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism: Why the Middle East's Identity Conflicts Go 




Coalition on their Facebook page. These sources put forward the views of Bahrain’s 
political groups on issues relating to the causes and results of the uprising 
In 2011, Bahrainis protested, demanding greater rights for citizens. However, the 
conflict and political negotiations that followed revealed that these political groups have 
different conceptions of what defines a Bahraini citizen. The Bahraini state was young, and 
while all of the groups I have studied would have said they were Bahraini nationalists, they 
would not have agreed on what that meant. The discourse on this issue of Bahraini identity 
has coalesced around four different issues: national dialogue, terrorism, expatriates, and 
the GCC union. The different ways that groups within the royal family, the Shi’i 













Table 1: A table of Bahrain’s major political groups  
Al-Wifaq’s Coalition 
(officially registered with the 
government) 
al-Wifaq Shi’i islamist political society 
National Democratic Gathering 
Society (al-Qawmi) 
Shi’i islamist political society 
Unitary National Democratic 
Assemblage (Wahdawy) 
Shi’i islamist political society 
National Democratic Action Society 
(Waad) 
Secular political society 
Ekhaa National Society (Ekhaa) Shi’i Islamist political society 
Unofficial Opposition al-Haqq Banned Shi’i islamist political 
society 
al-‘Amal Banned  Shi’i islamist political 
society 
February 14 Youth Coalition Shi’i youth activist group 
Saraya al-Ashtar, Bahrain Fist etc. Shi’i militant groups 
Sunni Groups The National Gathering of Unity Sunni activist group 
al-Fatih Youth Coalition Sunni youth activist group 
al-Minbar Muslim Brotherhood affiliated 
political society 










Al-Wifaq, a Shi’i Islamist political society, was the most prominent opposition 
group before and after the uprising began.5 Al-Wifaq had been active in Bahraini politics 
since the 1980s, and it was the largest opposition presence in Parliament before its 
parliamentarians resigned to protest the government crackdown on protesters.6 Throughout 
the uprising, al-Wifaq led an opposition coalition including both Islamist and secular 
groups. Beginning in February 2011, it recast itself as the representative of all pro-
democracy protestors. Although it was an Islamist party, al-Wifaq very rarely used 
religious rhetoric or language in its statements. Instead, it called for greater rights for 
Bahrain’s citizens based on nationalist and democratic principles. However, it was also 
deeply critical of the government’s decision to grant citizenship to some expatriates, and 
effort it views as an attempt to subsume Bahrain’s Shi’i majority in a larger Sunni 
population. The international media commonly referred to this coalition as “the opposition” 
or the “Shi’i opposition.” It generally referred to itself as the “Democratic opposition.” 
Since all of these terms are problematic, I refer to it as “al-Wifaq’s coalition.” 
Not all opposition groups participated in this coalition. al-Haqq (truth) and the 
Islamic Action Society, commonly known as al-’Amal, developed in the 1990s when they 
splintered from al-Wifaq because they believed that it was wrong to cooperate with the 
                                                          
5 Bahrain's Constitution bans political parties, so organized political groups were known as "political 
societies." 
6 Habib Toumi, "Lower chamber accepts resignation of 11 al-Wifaq MPs," Gulf Daily News (Dubai, UAE), 




“illegitimate Khalifa regime” by participating in parliamentary elections.7 Because of this 
attitude, they never held seats in Parliament. The divisions between al-Wifaq and its allies 
and the “uncooperative” political societies deepened after the institution of a new 
constitution in 2003.8 The constitution was the result of the National Action Charter, a 
referendum passed by 98 percent of Bahrain’s population. It proposed political and 
electoral reforms including the delegation of many royal powers to Parliament, and the 
election, rather than appointment, of the Shura Council. 9 When it was finished, however, 
the constitution was a reversal of the government’s stated reformist position and the 
National Action Charter. It gave more power than ever to the King and other members of 
the Royal family, and imposing new restraints on political participation and the press.10 
Many of Bahrain’s Shi’is regarded the National Action Charter referendum as the 
high point of Bahrain’s post-independence history.11 For this reason, they mostly 
considered the 2003 Constitution, which was imposed by royal command, as a deep 
                                                          
7 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008),256-6 
8 Justin Gengler, "Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf" (PhD diss., The 
University of Michigan, 2011), 60-1 
9 The Shura Council was the upper house of Bahrain's bicameral legislature. All of its members were 
appointed by the King. 
10 for an in-depth discussion of the 2003 constitution see S. M. Wright, 2008, “Fixing the Kingdom: 
Political Evolution and Socio-Economic Challenges in Bahrain” (Doha: Center for International and 
Regional Studies) 
11 See, for example: 'Isa Sayar, "A Citizen’s Letter to His Representative in the Dialogue," editorial, al-
Wasat (Manama, Bahrain), February 12, 2013, 
http://www.alwasatnews.com/3811/news/read/738498/1.html and the Bahraini Opposition. "Manama 




betrayal. In the wake of this reversal, many members of al-Wifaq became disillusioned 
with Bahrain’s political process and joined al-Haqq or al-‘Amal.12 
In the first weeks of the uprising, it seemed that the influence of these two parties 
would continue to increase. al-Haqq’s leader Hassan Mushai’ma returned from exile in 
London on February 20, 2011 and was greeted with a hero’s welcome. 13 However, the 
majority of the leadership of al-Haqq and al-‘Amal was arrested late in March and early 
April 2011, and al-‘Amal was banned.14 al-Haqq had operated underground since it failed 
to register as an official political society in 2005.15 Although both continued to operate to 
a certain extent underground, by 2013 they were no longer a political force.16 Some of their 
members apparently joined al-Wifaq or the other mainstream opposition societies, while 
others began to identify themselves as members of the February 14 Youth Coalition.17 
The February 14 Youth Coalition was a nebulous and anonymous group that 
developed as a result of the large-scale government crackdown on protests in late March 
                                                          
12 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008),287-9 
13 Thomas Fuller, "Bahrain opposition leader returns from exile," New York Times (NY), February 26, 
2011, accessed November 23, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/middleeast/27bahrain.html?_r=0. 
14 Andrew Hammond, "Bahrain says group follows violent Shite cleric," Reuters, June 4, 2012, accessed 
November 23, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/04/us-bahrain-party-cleric-
idUSBRE8530QC20120604.  
15 Justin Gengler, "Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf" (PhD diss., 
The University of Michigan, 2011), 106. 
16 Al-‘Amal’s website and social media accounts are all inactive at the time of writing.  
17 Groups as such as Bahrain Fist claimed to be endorsed by al-Haqq and al-‘Amal 
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and early April 2011.18 It was not an officially recognized political society. In fact, its chief 
manifestation was an active and popular Facebook page that the unknown organizers used 
to disseminate protest posters and to post photos and videos of protest marches and 
confrontations with police. This page became active in April 2011 and as of January 2014 
had over 64,000 “likes,” a marked demonstration of popularity in the country with little 
more than 700,000 citizens.19 The page also spawned dozens of spin-off and fan accounts.20 
Nevertheless, the nature of February 14’s offline organization -if any- remained 
unclear. The groups of Shi’is, primarily young men from rural villages, who routinely 
protested and clashed with the police on the weekends were considered by most observers 
to be “members of February 14” but this may have been more of a self-appointed role than 
a sign of membership in any type of an organized group.21 Anyone who printed out a 
February 14 poster and carried it in a protest may have considered themselves to be a 
February 14 member. By this definition, the February 14 Youth Coalition was the largest 
and most active political group in Bahrain, but it is not surprising that it was not invited to 
participate in the national dialogue. Nevertheless, any plan for Bahrain’s future would have 
to account for them. 
                                                          
18 Toby Mathiesson reported hearing discussion of the February 14 movement at the Pearl roundabout as 
early as February 19, 2011, but there was no online documentation of this. 
19 Facebook. Accessed November 23, 2013. https://www.facebook.com/Coalition14th. 
20 Facebook, accessed November 23, 2013, 
https://www.facebook.com/search/178269738890732/likers/pages-liked. 
21 Toby C. Jones and Ala'a Shehabi, "Bahrain's Revolutionaries," Foreign Policy, January 2, 2012, accessed 




Another group that came to prominence in the midst of the March 2011 crackdown 
was the Sunni opposition. Originally mobilizing to support the government in the face of 
the “Shi’i rebellion,” this group quickly became critical of the government’s “lenient” 
treatment of the Shi’is. Gradually, this criticism expanded to encompass the government’s, 
and in particular the royal family’s, lack of support for the Sunni population. The National 
Gathering of Unity (TNGOU) was the largest and most influential of these Sunni groups.22 
TNGOU was initially excluded from the national dialogue, but it organized protests 
demanding to be included, and was eventually granted several seats. A few youth 
organizations favoring more direct and violent confrontation with the Shi’i opposition 
splintered off from TNGOU, although their size and influence was unclear. Regardless of 
their actual power, the existence of these groups contributed significantly to the tension in 
Bahrain. 23  
 
                                                          
22 Justin Gengler, "Bahrain's Sunni Awakening," Middle East Report, January 17, 2012, accessed October 
15, 2013, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712. 
23 Justin Gengler, "Bahrain's Sunni Awakening," Middle East Report, January 17, 2012, accessed October 
15, 2013, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712. 
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Figure. 1 The Al Khalifa Family Tree 24
 
Figure. 2 The Al Khalifa Family Tree detail showing the Khawalid. 25 
 
 
                                                          
24 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shīʿa Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 59, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
25 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shīʿa Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 61, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
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THE ROYAL FAMILY 
Although Bahrain’s royal family are Sunni Muslims, they and their close tribal 
allies are held somewhat aloof from Bahrain’s other Sunni citizens. When the Al Khalifa 
conquered Bahrain in 1801, they brought with them other members of their tribal 
confederation.26 In the next two centuries, these tribal allies were granted agricultural 
estates and other favors and privileges.27 However, when Bahrain began modernizing after 
the discovery of oil, the king increasingly consolidated power within his immediate family 
and inner circle, and the other tribal groups were shut out. Bahrain’s other Sunnis were 
non-tribal immigrants from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province, immigrants from Iran, 
merchants from the other Gulf cities attracted by the pearl trade and other business 
opportunities in the thriving port city of Manama. These immigrants were dependent on 
the Royal family and gained a reputation for being politically quiescent. After 
independence, some immigrants from India and Pakistan gained citizenship, often in 
recognition of their work for the military and police.28 The royal family saw itself as distinct 
from these Sunni groups. While it regarded the Sunni population as more loyal than the 
Shi’is, it traditionally described itself as an impartial arbiter in the periodic conflicts 
                                                          
26 Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an 
Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 22-25. 
27
 Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an 
Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 44-6. 




between the Sunnis and Shi’is.29 This attitude seemed to have antagonized some politically 
active Sunnis, leading them to form the Sunni opposition group TNGOU. 
When it announced the new national dialogue, Bahrain’s government was also far 
from united. The deepening divisions within the Royal family were signaled by the 
government’s inconsistent policy towards the opposition. In fact, to discuss “the 
government” as distinct from “the royal family” is largely meaningless. Members of the Al 
Khalifa held nearly all the major cabinet positions, and the majority of all cabinet posts.30 
Al-Wifaq has repeatedly demanded that a member of the royal family participate in the 
dialogue, knowing that decisions reached without the Al Khalifas’ approval would lack 
authority.31 Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the king’s uncle, has been the Prime Minister 
of Bahrain since it gained its independence in 1971, making him the world’s longest ruling 
Prime Minister. He was also widely regarded as the most powerful man in Bahrain, as well 
as being one of the country’s largest landholders and one of its chief industrial magnates.32 
Ahmed Bin Atiyatallah Al Khalifa, the Royal Court Minister, was likewise regarded as a 
                                                          
29
 Gengler has argued that the government of Bahrain encouraged competition between the Sunnis and 
Shiites in order to limit the meaningful opposition. See, for example: Justin Gengler, "Ethnic Conflict and 
Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf" (PhD diss., The University of Michigan, 2011), 
30 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shi’a Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 53, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
31 Al-Wifaq, "Statement on the National Dialogue," news release, March 6, 2013, accessed November 23, 
2013, http://alAl-Wifaq.net/cms/2013/03/06/7624/. 
32 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shi’a Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 59, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
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power behind the throne. Together, these two lead a faction in the Royal family known as 
the Khawalid. The Bahraini press rarely discusses royal family power struggles, but outside 
observers characterized this faction as opposed to any kind of political liberalization, and 
many view them as the real architects of the controversial 2003 constitution. They tend to 
be hostile to Bahrain’s Shi’is, and to view the uprising as primarily a security problem, to 
be solved by a military intervention.33 As can be seen in the family tree above, they control 
many of the “power ministries,” such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the 
Interior, and the Ministry of Justice. This faction includes many members of the king’s 
father’s generation, but the royal family did not divide strictly along generational lines. For 
example, King Hamad’s fifth son Prince Nasser has been an outspoken conservative and 
has been openly hostile to the opposition. Prominent opposition prisoners have accused 
Prince Nasser of personally participating in torture. 
On the other side of the equation were the moderates, led by Crown Prince Salman. 
This group includes royal family members who participated in the Crown Prince’s 
Economic Development Board, a sort of shadow cabinet operated by the Crown Prince 
between 2008 and 2011 with a focus on economic reform and liberalization.34 The Crown 
Prince was admired by many members of the opposition for his willingness to meet with 
                                                          
33 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shi’a Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 53, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
34 Justin Gengler, "Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shi’a Problem’ in 
Bahrain," Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2013): 62, 
accessed October 15, 2013, doi:10.1080/21534764.2013.802944. 
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them at the beginning of the uprising, although that effort ultimately failed. 35 Outside 
observers also believe that he was the driving force behind the current National Dialogue, 
and he engaged in various conciliatory efforts including visiting opposition and other Shi’i 
majales, open houses held during Ramadan, at one point being photographed by a 
newspaper photographer seated next to opposition leader Khalil Marzooq.36 
Despite these manifestations of goodwill, it was difficult to determine where 
exactly the “moderates” stood with regard to the opposition’s demands since the Crown 
Prince and his supporters rarely speak about it in concrete terms. His lack of a clear plan 
may have been strategic as he negotiated his own position within the royal family, but it 
jeopardized his support among the opposition. He was increasingly regarded as ineffective. 
Nevertheless, he retained many admirers among Western scholars, who saw him as a hope 
for democracy in Bahrain.37 Another, more cynical view of the moderates, has argued that 
they pushed for negotiations to distract the opposition and kill time while they waited for 
                                                          
35 Justin Gengler, "Crown Prince Salman Appointed Managing First Deputy Prime Minister for Important 
and Serious Affairs," Religion and Politics in Bahrain (blog), entry posted March 12, 2013, accessed 
November 23, 2013, http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2013/03/crown-prince-salman-appointed-
managing.html. 
36 Bawaba al-Bahrain, Picture of the Crown Prince at the al-Aali Family Majlis, Sitting near the Terrorist 
Khalil al-Marzuq, photograph, Bawaba al-Bahrain, July 18, 2013, accessed November 24, 2013, 
http://b4bh.com/b/newspaper-view-4999.html. 
37 Justin Gengler, "Crown Prince Salman Appointed Managing First Deputy Prime Minister for Important 
and Serious Affairs," Religion and Politics in Bahrain (blog), entry posted March 12, 2013, accessed 




the situation to calm down.38 In November 2012, although many, both in the government 
and the opposition, were skeptical about the dialogue’s chance of success, the fact that it 
happened at all was regarded as a victory for the crown prince’s faction. 
The king’s role in this conflict was hotly debated. At the time of the National Action 
Charter, he was perceived both by outsiders and by many Bahrainis as a pioneering 
reformer. This reputation was reversed, however, after the imposition of the 2003 
Constitution. Most observers regarded him either as a pragmatist who used the threat of 
reform as a weapon in the family power struggle, or as a completely powerless figure who 
is constantly buffeted by the changing power dynamic within his family.39 The February 
14 Youth Coalition, on the other hand, regarded him as the ultimate symbol of government 
oppression, and made him the target of their fiercest antigovernment rhetoric. “Down, 
down Hamad!” was the ubiquitous message in Bahrain’s anti-government graffiti, 
particularly in Shi’i villages. 40 
Finally, in this case, as with many issues in Bahrain, it is important to consider the 
role of the international community. Some commentators have suggested that the national 
                                                          
38 See for example: Elizabeth Dickinson, "All Talk," Foreign Policy, October 31, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/31/all_talk_bahrain. 
39 See, for example: Abbas Busafwan, The Structure of Tyranny in Bahrain: A Study of the Balance of 
Power within the Ruling Family (London: Bahrain Centre for Studies in London, 2012), accessed 
December 1, 2013, http://www.bcsl.org.uk/en/publications/bahrain-structure-tyranny-power/1547-bahrain-
structure-tyranny-power.  
40
 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn't (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 33. 
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dialogue is primarily a public relations exercise for the benefit of Western governments. 
Whatever the truth of this, both Bahrain’s economy and its national defense were closely 
linked to the West, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Western 
influence in Bahrain had an impact on how both the government and the opposition framed 
their actions.  
By framing its solution to the conflict in terms of participatory democracy, the 
government made it possible for Western governments to continue supporting it, doing 
business with it, and supplying it with weapons, without loss of face internationally. By 
the same token, the willingness of al-Wifaq’s coalition to couch their struggle in terms of 
“democracy promotion” and “human rights” let them present themselves as suitable 
recipients of Western support and possible future partners in the event of regime change. 
Both the government and the entire spectrum of the opposition spent considerable time, 
money, and effort on their international public relations. According to Bahrain Watch, a 
UK-based NGO, the Government of Bahrain had spent more than $2 billion on public 
relations in the US and the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2012.41 Opposition figures 
such as Maryam Al Khawaja and Nabeel Rajab were ubiquitous on social media with tens 
of thousands of followers, and al-Wifaq published its statements in both Arabic and 
                                                          
41 "PR Watch: Keeping an Eye on the Kingdom's PR," Bahrain Watch, last modified November 23, 2012, 
accessed April 27, 2013, http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/. 
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English. It is therefore reasonable to assume that many of the statements coming from both 
sides were intended for an international audience. 
As the ever-increasing number of political groups in Bahrain demonstrated, the 
country’s political divisions are far more complex than a Sunni-Shi’i divide. Each of the 
groups claimed to speak for “true Bahrainis,” and they were divided by this question: who 
















Chapter 1: The National Dialogue 
The national dialogue began on February 10, 2013. Its stated aim was to “define 
mutual visions that will further enhance the reform process towards overall development 
and progress.”42 It was moderated by the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaikh 
Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa. Participating were 10 Sunni political societies, al-Wifaq’s 
coalition, and eight pro-government “independent” parliamentarians. The first few sessions 
of the dialogue, assembled under the slogan “Bahrain. Our Unity,” provoked a storm of 
comment in the pro-government and opposition press, and a flurry of statements on 
political societies’ websites. Essentially, the national dialogue was viewed as an invitation 
to discuss the nature of Bahraini citizenship.  
Each of Bahrain’s political groups saw the dialogue differently depending on their 
perception of true Bahraini citizenship. By inviting only specific groups to participate in 
the dialogue, the government signaled which opposition groups they considered true 
citizens with legitimate concerns. By participating, al-Wifaq’s coalition conceded the 
legitimacy of the government. The February 14 Youth Coalition and other more militant 
Shi’i groups sought the fall of the government and regarded the Al Khalifa as illegitimate, 
so they viewed political negotiation as a distraction from the cause of Shi’i self-defense. 
Sunni groups saw themselves as the only loyal citizens and participated in the dialogue to 
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ensure that the government did not give too much away to the Shi’is while failing to reward 
the Sunnis. The conservative faction of the Royal family considered the entire Shi’i 
opposition as foreign agents, with no right to make demands on the Bahraini government. 
This national dialogue was actually the third dialogue planned since the 2011 
uprising. The first, which began in June 2011, included 300 participants, five of whom 
represented the Shi’i opposition.43 Gengler has referred to this effort as the government 
“fighting dialogue with dialogue,” since the huge number of participants made serious 
discussion virtually impossible, and the dialogue succeeded mainly in temporarily halting 
protests.44 It effectively collapsed on July 17, 2011 when al-Wifaq withdrew from the 
dialogue, frustrated with the lack of progress. The remaining dialogue participants 
concluded on July 29 by recommending that the King devolve a small amount of power 
over ministries to Parliament. Most importantly, they recommended that the Prime Minister 
be allowed to appoint ministers, rather than ministers being appointed by the King. When 
these recommendations were implemented, however, they were perceived as a victory 
more for the Prime Minister than for the opposition.45 
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An attempt at dialogue in March 2005 sponsored by the Royal Court Minister 
Sheikh Ahmad Bin Atiyatallah Al Khalifa failed after Sunni political groups announced 
they would boycott. On finding that they had not, in fact, been invited to participate in the 
dialogue, Sunni groups demonstrated against it.46 The idea was quietly dropped soon 
afterward. Interestingly, rumors circulated on opposition news site at the time claimed that 
the government was willing to consider the opposition demands outlined “Manama 
Document”. Due to this history, the announcement of the national dialogue encountered 
mixed reactions. This chapter looks at discourse on the national dialogue in opinion pieces 
published in the Bahraini press, with a focus on the first week of the dialogue. These 
perspectives are supplemented with statements from al-Wifaq and other opposition 
societies. 
THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THE DIALOGUE 
According to official government statements, the 2013 dialogue, like its 
predecessors, was intended not as a negotiation between the government and the 
opposition, but as a venue for all sections of society to dialogue with one another. The 
government merely attended to “facilitate” dialogue.47 This position echoes what Gengler 
described as the Royal family’s traditional role in Bahrain’s sectarian struggles. The 
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government stood apart and acted as an arbiter between Bahrain Sunni and Shi’i 
populations.48 Although the government considered the Sunnis a loyal constituency, it was 
not seen as a Sunni group itself, and so it did not participate in sectarian struggles. Despite 
the royal family’s insistence that it was not a participant in the dialogue, the Al Khalifas 
and their role in Bahrain were among the major topics in media discussion of the dialogue. 
Many of the questions that surrounded the dialogue dealt with the royal family’s place in 
Bahraini politics 
THE PRESS AND PERSPECTIVES IN BAHRAIN 
Although opinions and attitudes varied slightly from article to article, the opinions 
expressed tended to correspond to the royal family affiliation of the particular newspaper 
in which they were published.  
Al-Watan, a paper regarded as close to the conservative faction of the Royal Court, 
was fiercely critical of the opposition.49 They tended to be particularly hostile to the Shi’i 
opposition, and were concerned about Bahrain’s cultural and moral decay.50 Al-Watan 
described its goals as “maintaining national and Arab principles and giving full support to 
the law-and-order system.”51 Its editor-in-chief was Yousif Bin Khalil, known for his 
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eleven-part article series "Ayatollah Obama and Bahrain,” which linked perceived US 
support for the opposition to a US-Iranian plot. Unsurprisingly, al-Watan’s columnists 
were generally not optimistic about the dialogue’s prospects, and their criticism of the 
dialogue was indirect criticism of the moderates who were behind it. 
Although obviously a pro-government newspaper, Akhbar al-Khalij was more 
difficult to categorize than al-Watan. The Prime Minister owns a significant share of the 
paper, and its editorials generally follow his anti-opposition, pro-Saudi Arabia views.52 
However, Akhbar al-Khalij was less openly critical of the opposition than al-Watan, and it 
tended to support the government’s official line. The Minister of State for Information 
Affairs, Sameera Rajab was a regular contributor before accepting a government post. 
Furthermore, Akhbar al-Khalij’s history as Bahrain’s only leftist newspaper occasionally 
showed in its criticism of the government for social and economic problems. Al-Ayam was 
Bahrain’s most widely-read newspaper with 36,000 daily subscribers. Owned by former 
Information Minister Nabil al-Hamar, its writers included Sunni and Shi’i clerics, 
academics, and government officials. Members of the royal family occasionally also wrote 
op-eds for this paper.53 
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At the other end of the spectrum, al-Wasat was nominally an independent 
newspaper, but it generally favored the opposition. In March 2011, al-Wasat was shut 
down and its editor-in-chief Mansour al-Jamri was arrested. It was later reopened with a 
new, presumably more pliant, editorial staff.54 Although al-Jamri was actually reinstated, 
the newspaper became more cautious in its coverage. For this reason, many of its readers 
defected to the online outlets the Bahrain Mirror and the Manama Voice. These two online 
sources, run primarily by Bahraini journalists living abroad, took an outspokenly pro-
opposition stance and were widely read among Bahraini Shi’is. Bahrain Mirror, in 
particular, was very influential, although it reports were unreliable and its sources are 
almost never named. 
These opposition news sources varied in their opinions of the dialogue. Some al-
Wasat columnists considered it as an important victory for the opposition, while others are 
suspicious of the government’s motives. The Bahrain Mirror and the Manama Voice 
reported almost nothing about the national dialogue, focusing instead on ongoing 
confrontations between police and protesters and on human rights abuses. 
THE PRO-GOVERNMENT PRESS AND THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE SHI’I OPPOSITION 
Discussion of this question in Akhbar al-Khalij and al-Watan focused on the issue 
of foreign interference. The discourse on foreign interference was one of the longest 
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running themes in Bahraini politics, and this focus was not surprising in a small island 
surrounded by more powerful neighbors.55 Bahrain’s royal family has been concerned 
about the prospect of Iranian interference for decades, but their unease has been particularly 
acute since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, when a movement led by Shi’i clerics toppled 
Iran’s monarchy.56 These tensions were heightened after a statement by Iranian 
parliamentarian claiming Bahrain as Iran’s “thirteenth province.”57 
In the view of many Bahraini Sunnis, the Shi’i population was an “Iranian fifth 
column” actively working to destabilize the government. Gengler described this as one of 
the “myths of Bahrain.” 58 This myth is so ubiquitous in Bahrain’s political discourse that 
the phrase “foreign interference” in a newspaper article can serve as shorthand for the entire 
argument that the Shi’is were linked to Iran.59 
More recently, the Bahrain government became concerned with the role of 
Hezbollah in Bahrain’s uprising. The Bahraini media reported that Hezbollah had trained 
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members of February 14 youth in the use of weapons and explosives.60 Newspapers also 
repeatedly published photos of seized weapons caches in rooms adorned with Hezbollah 
and Iranian flags and posters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Concerns about Hezbollah rose 
further due to Hezbollah’s blatant role in Syria’s Civil War. Security-minded members of 
Bahrain’s government describe Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria was part of a region-
wide Iranian plot.61 
Al-Watan is the most explicit in linking al-Wifaq and Iran. In fact, al-Watan has 
routinely referred to the political society as “Iran-linked al-Wifaq” without feeling the need 
to justify the description. The link between Iran and al-Wifaq was a truism among their 
audience. The Iranian media’s vocal support for Bahrain’s Shi’is was seen as further 
evidence of this connection. Al-Watan articles also have tended to generalize about the 
opposition, lumping them all together under the label of al-Wifaq.  
One al-Watan article titled “Away from the Dialogue and into the Lion's Den” 
insisted “there is no true revolution in Bahrain,” saying that the entire uprising was an 
Iranian plot.62 The author argued that al-Wifaq had been misleading honest Bahraini 
citizens, and is now cynically working to derail the dialogue. He went on to imply that all 
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attempts at dialogue would be fruitless because the members of al-Wifaq were not true 
citizens of Bahrain, and so they are not interested in a real resolution of conflict. 
In a similar vein, the article “Strikes and the Return of Teams” asserted that al-
Wifaq is behind the bombings and other street violence, and questions the government’s 
willingness to “negotiate with terrorists.”63 Another article published a few days after the 
beginning of the dialogue contended that it was already beginning to fail because of a lack 
of trust. 64 It attributed this lack of trust to the opposition’s “encouragement of radicalism” 
and to the spread of “terrorism,” probably a reference to the rise of the February 14 Youth 
Coalition.65 The author argued that if the dialogue was to succeed, religious authorities 
needed to encourage stability and national unity. This last statement was a reference to 
Sheikh ‘Isa al-Qasim, al-Wifaq’s spiritual leader. Al-Qasim did not have an official post in 
al-Wifaq, but he was Bahrain’s most respected Shi’i cleric, and he served in Parliament in 
the “religious bloc” that was a precursor to al-Wifaq.66 Bahraini Sunnis were particularly 
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suspicious of Qasim because he studied Shi’i theology in Iran’s holy city of Qom before 
returning to Bahrain to hold the seat in Parliament. 67 
Al-Watan articles were also concerned with al-Wifaq’s relationship with foreign 
powers other than Iran. In 2012, the newspaper ran an 11-part series, written by the paper’s 
editor-in-chief, on President Obama’s secret relationship to al-Wifaq and through al-Wifaq 
to Iran.68 All of these arguments about al-Wifaq’s links to foreign countries eventually lead 
back to Iran. In an article criticizing the fact that the leadership of al-Wifaq made a trip to 
Russia, the author noted Russia’s long-standing links to Bashar al-Assad and connected 
this to Assad’s alliance with Iran.69 These accusations became so well known that a picture 
of President Obama photoshopped with a turban can stand for the entire argument.70 This 
argument portrayed al-Wifaq, and through al-Wifaq the entire opposition, as merely an 
agent of colonial powers, and it was a direct retort to al-Wifaq’s portrayal of itself as a 
representative of “true Bahraini citizens.” 
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The skepticism of all the al-Watan columnists about the dialogue and the 
accusations about al-Wifaq and the opposition were also were indirect attacks on the 
moderate faction of the royal family. Those within the royal family who believed that a 
political solution was possible invested much of their credibility in the National Dialogue 
project. By suggesting that al-Wifaq and others were manipulating the dialogue even as 
they committed terrorist acts in the streets, they implied that the dialogue was a naïve and 
doomed project and that those within the Royal family who promoted it were fools. More 
fundamentally, these articles argued that any opposition to the government equated to 
terrorism, and that the government should not negotiate with terrorists. Thus, it dismissed 
the idea that there was any legitimate and sincere opposition in Bahrain, and advocated a 
security solution to the problem. 
BAHRAIN’S LOYAL CITIZENS 
In general, Akhbar al-Khalij articles were more optimistic about the prospects of 
the dialogue, in keeping with their support for the official government position that the 
dialogue is worthwhile. Most of these columnists appeared willing to give it the benefit of 
the doubt. The first article published on the first day of the dialogue, entitled “The Dialogue 
of Truth,” described the dialogue as a gift from the gracious Royal family and said that 
“the whole spectrum of opinion would be represented.”71 This article differed from al-
Watan articles in that it assumed that legitimate opposition to the government may exist. 
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However, it went on to emphasize the importance of “renouncing fanaticism,” if the 
dialogue was to succeed. Although it did not explain the meaning of “fanaticism,” or who 
exactly was expected to renounce it, given the context, it is reasonable to assume that it 
refers to al-Wifaq and possibly to the February 14 movement.72 This means that the article 
assumed the existence of a “reasonable opposition” who was not represented by these 
groups, and who would be willing to negotiate with the government in good faith. 
Another article was a direct response to a sermon by al-Qasim about the national 
dialogue. He refuted al-Qasim’s accusations that the royal family act as “dictators” in 
Bahrain, saying the governance in Bahrain was a partnership between the royal family and 
“loyal citizens” and also challenged al-Wifaq’s claim to be working for democracy, saying 
that the political society itself was not democratic, but authoritarian.73 It also mentioned 
the threat posed by an “adolescent movement,” a more clear reference to February 14. This 
article is unusual for Akhbar al-Khalij in that it made direct accusations against specific 
groups. In general, editorials in this paper refer vaguely to “dissident groups” or “foreign 
agents” implying that at least some part of al-Wifaq’s coalition were actual citizens with 
legitimate grievances. 
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Of all Bahraini newspapers, al-Ayam was the best representation of moderate royal 
faction, and the opinion pieces published in the al-Ayam newspaper during this first week 
of the dialogue, spoke directly to the opposition’s argument about trying to bring 
democracy to Bahrain. Several of these articles invoke the national action charter and the 
2003 constitutionalize evidence of the government’s efforts at reform. One article asserted 
that Bahrain was already a democracy.74 Another article argued that all citizens have the 
same goals and that political society should overcome sectarianism for the sake of the 
national interest.75 
The argument that the Shi’i opposition were not true citizens of Bahrain had been 
implied by the Prime Minister throughout the uprising, and directly stated by the head of 
the Bahrain Defense force, Field Marshal Shaikh Khalifa Bin Ali Al Khalifa.76 However, 
if the government insisted that the opposition consisted entirely of foreign agents, whether 
agents of Iran or agents of the US Embassy, that made the entire project the National 
Dialogue ridiculous. It would clearly be inappropriate for the government to negotiate with 
“foreign terrorist agents,” in order to justify the existence of the national dialogue, in the 
government must concede the existence of a “good-faith opposition” with whom it could 
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negotiate. This explained the assumption of many articles that there was some sort of 
legitimate opposition led astray by the extremist elements. However, the assertion of 
several of the al-Watan editorials that the entire opposition was acting in bad faith toward 
the government makes the government look either naïve – because it attempted to negotiate 
with obvious terrorists – disingenuous – because it put on a show of negotiation with 
terrorists – or weak – since it was forced to negotiate with terrorists because it was unable 
to stop them. 
THE NATIONAL GATHERING OF UNITY AND THE SUNNI PERSPECTIVE 
The Sunni opposition called for many of the same reforms as al-Wifaq’s coalition, 
but in practice they primarily sought to prevent al-Wifaq’s coalition from gaining an 
advantage over the Sunni citizens. They were concerned that the government was not 
protecting the interests of their most loyal citizens. 
At a rally in June 2011, Dr. Abdul Latif al-Mahmood, head of the Sunni opposition 
coalition The National Gathering of Unity (TNGOU) explicitly claimed that the 
government was weak. Speaking about alleged US intervention in Bahrain, he said: “If the 
regime is too weak to stand up to the U.S., they need to declare that so people can have 
their say."77 When the 2013 National Dialogue was announced, TNGOU organized 
demonstrations to demand that it be granted seats at the dialogue table. As it explained in 
                                                          




the “"The Story of the National Gathering of Unity” section on its website, TNGOU “seeks 
to bring balance to the national dialogue.”78 TNGOU’s role as a balancing force was echoed 
by a cartoon published in the Ahkbar al-Khalij newspaper shortly after the group was first 
formed. The cartoon depicted the kingdom as a small traditional fishing boat, pushed 
almost to the point of capsizing by a giant wave. In the next panel, the boat was steadied 
and held upright by a wave from the opposite direction labeled “The National Gathering of 
Unity.” The third panel showed the boat sailing tranquilly on a calm sea.79 The Prime 
Minister echoed this characterization of the loyalist opposition, describing it as “standing 
united as a bulwark defending their country against subversive conspiracies."80 
AL-WIFAQ AND THE DIALOGUE 
Much of al-Wifaq’s discourse between the announcement of the dialogue and the 
first session was focused on denying government accusations that it was a foreign-backed 
terrorist organization. It repeatedly and vehemently denied any involvement with Iran and 
Hezbollah.81 In its statements on the dialogue, it argued that the dialogue was the result of 
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its own peaceful demands for greater democracy in Bahrain.82 It implied that a political 
solution was possible, as long as the government operates in good faith. It also implied that 
al-Wifaq believed that some within the government are capable of negotiating in good faith 
with the opposition. Naturally, as a dialogue participant, al-Wifaq had a vested interest in 
the success of the dialogue, so it was consistent for them to put a positive spin on the 
dialogue and its public statements. 
In one of its first official statements on the dialogue, al-Wifaq outlined its goals for 
the dialogue. These were virtually identical to the demands it had been making since the 
beginning of the uprising: 
The founding of an elected executive authority which expresses the 
popular will , Defining the authorities of the legislative authority Fair 
electoral system, independence of the judicial authority, The integration 
of all in the security services, Political naturalization, discrimination, 
corruption, transitional justice, implementing the recommendations of 
both the (BICI) and the UN Human Rights Council, including the release 
of all prisoners of conscience, allowing fundamental freedoms and 
rationalizing government and quasi-government media.83 
Al-Wifaq also took issue with the justice minister’s statement that “the dialogue 
cannot be serious if the National Democratic Opposition Parties are to demand authorities 
from the partakers, who do not have these authorities in the first place.”84 An al-Wifaq 
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statement retorted “the people are the source of all powers.” The statement also alleged 
that the dialogue so far “lacks seriousness,” because those with real decision-making power 
are not participating.85 Nevertheless, al-Wifaq confirmed its commitment to the dialogue 
as a “strategic choice, and its commitment to finding permanent solutions to “Bahrain’s 
political crisis.”86 
Later statements expressed the political societies’ growing frustration with the lack 
of progress in the dialogue. Their primary issues were the “unfair representation” in the 
dialogue, in particular the presence of “independents”87 There were eight “independents” 
participating in the dialogue, as opposed to six representatives from the Democratic 
opposition political societies. Al-Wifaq alleged that all of these “independents” were pro-
government. In this view, the eight independents, plus the 10 representatives of the Sunni 
opposition societies meant that pro-government supporters outnumbered opposition 
members three to one. The situation particularly incensed the opposition because it 
mirrored what they viewed as the greatest injustice in Bahrain: the underrepresentation of 
Bahrain’s Shi’i majority in national politics.  
Frustration growing, al-Wifaq withdrew from the dialogue three times between 
February and December. In the statement announcing al-Wifaq’s first withdrawal, Ali 
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Salman cited the ongoing government crackdown as the reason for the withdrawal. He also 
called on the government to stop “the sectarian media rhetoric” and to allow the opposition 
equal access to the media.88 Subsequent statements expressed frustration over the lack of 
progress in the dialogue and the government’s unwillingness to address issues of 
representation. Even after these objections, al-Wifaq, and its allies who occasionally 
withdrew as well in solidarity, always returned to the negotiating table. 
Al-Wifaq had to remain committed to the dialogue because it is a political party 
and had been designed to work within a political system. Its goal for these negotiations was 
to empower parliament. For these reasons, while al-Wifaq criticized the government it 
never directly questioned the legitimacy of the government. Philosophically, they have 
favored political solutions to the civil disobedience favored by al-Haqq and al-‘Amal.89 
This stance also distinguished it from groups in favor more direct physical confrontation, 
such as the February 14 Youth Coalition, whose methods and ideology I will discuss at 
more length in the next chapter. 
AL-WASAT AND PRO-OPPOSITION SKEPTICS 
The opinion pieces in al-Wasat demonstrated the variance in opinion even among 
those who tended to support the opposition. In general, these editorials took a much more 
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pessimistic view of the dialogue than al-Wifaq’s statements. In the article, “The 
Dialogue… A Dialogue Waiting for Openness” the author contended that the dialogue was 
merely a trap for the opposition. 90 The author believed there could be no political solution 
without dealing with Bahrain’s underlying political injustices. The author also noted that 
the government’s tightening security posture contradicted its supposed willingness for 
dialogue. Another article, “Playing with the Meaning of Consensus” referenced the earlier 
2011 dialogue, arguing that since this dialogue did not succeed, there was no reason why 
the 2013 dialogue would succeed since nothing had changed.91 It echoed the earlier 
article’s assessment that the dialogue “was not an honest attempt.” 
92 Discussion was not 
necessary, since “both sides know what the other side wants.” 93 The article “Head to Head” 
took a more optimistic view, asserting that the opposition was in a strong position because 
of its widespread public support. As the article said, “a protest is better than referendum,” 
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as a demonstration of support.
94
 Nevertheless, the article emphasized the importance of 
equal representation. In the end, the writer was “fearing but hoping.”
95
 
Another article took a different view of the opposition’s relevance, addressing a 
group of citizens who were standing outside of the conflict between the opposition and the 
government.96 Its audience was a group of citizens who claimed only to want the “return 
of tranquility.” The article, “A Citizen’s Letter to His Representative in the Dialogue,” 
claimed to speak for these disinterested citizens.97 He argued that what all Bahrainis really 
want is “social justice,” noting sarcastically that “this is the 21st century.” It called on the 
government to implement the recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission 
of Inquiry Report and fight government corruption. Although the article carefully refrained 
from arguing for “regime change,” it referenced the martyrs, following the opposition’s 
official stance, but it also noted that there was much danger of sectarianism and division in 
Bahrain. This article also spoke to the citizen observers in Bahrain who were not 
participating in the uprising but who agreed with its goals. It described the “revolution” as 
a nationalist rather than a sectarian cause. In this conception, the “revolution” was a quest 
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for justice and democracy rather than another round of Bahrain’s sectarian conflict.98 In 
general, these articles echoed the same conception of the goals of the uprising as al-Wifaq’s 
press releases, but they expressed doubt that dialogue would help to achieve them 
The authors of these al-Wasat articles assumed that their audience was composed 
of citizens with a vested interest in the future of Bahrain. They echoed al-Wifaq’s broad 
conception of Bahraini citizenship and argued that the sectarian divisions were only getting 
in the way of cooperation to reform the government. 
REPRESENTATION, LOYALTY, AND CITIZENSHIP 
Almost nine months after the beginning of the dialogue, the participants had not 
reached an agreement, even on the first agenda item.
99
 The primary reason for this is that 
the different political groups were pursuing entirely separate agendas. Al-Wifaq had 
repeatedly emphasized its demand for equal representation in the dialogue, and refused to 
discuss any other issues until this demand was met. For those who held the view expressed 
in the Akhbar al-Khalij article, in which the National Dialogue was represented as a 
benevolent gift of the royal family, this demand must have seemed nonsensical.100 In their 
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view, it was the government’s dialogue so they could structure it in whatever way they 
chose. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of Sunni opposition societies was not part of the original 
plan for dialogue, but the government agreed to allow representatives from the Sunni 
opposition after these groups held large-scale protests. Because the Sunni opposition’s 
stated goal in participating in the dialogue was to counter the influence of al-Wifaq, it was 
not surprising that the dialogue achieved so little. 
Newspaper articles and statements demonstrate that in its discussion of the national 
dialogue, al-Wifaq and its allies were in conversation with the moderate faction of the royal 
family. Both sides affirmed their support for a political solution, and in its statements, al-
Wifaq addressed problems without questioning the overall viability of the dialogue. Al-
Wifaq strove for a political solution, its position exemplified in its protest slogan “the 
people want the reform of the regime” as opposed to “the people want the fall of the 
regime.”101 The Sunni opposition, on the other hand, shared the royal conservative’s 
concerns about growing Shi’i power and favored a security solution, rather than a political 
solution, to the continued unrest. Despite these diverging views, all of these groups were 
participating in the national dialogue and its discourse. 
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The February 14 Youth Coalition, on the other hand, responded to the national 
dialogue by ignoring it, demonstrating their lack of interest in political solutions. As al-
Wifaq issued statements discussing reconciliation and unity, February 14’s protest posters 
called for “resistance,” “sacred defense” and “occupying Manama.” 
102
 I will discuss 
February 14 further in the next chapter, but its lack of interest in the dialogue demonstrates 
that although it shared some goals with Al-Wifaq, its ideas about the government’s 
legitimacy and the nature of Bahraini citizenship were quite different. 
For all of the groups involved, the National Dialogue sparked a discussion on issues 
of Bahraini citizenship, the nature of governance, and national sovereignty. 
Representatives of the government, the Sunni opposition and the Shi’i-led opposition all 
participated in this discourse, explaining and justifying their definitions of democracy and 
citizenship.  
At the heart of all these discussions law the question of Bahraini identity, a question 
still very much under debate in this relatively young nation. This question was complicated 
by the fact that Bahrain functions as an “ethnocracy.’103 The royal family and their tribal 
allies were privileged above all other ethnic groups in terms of access to political power 
and economic opportunities. However, for many Bahraini Shi’is, the Al Khalifa and their 
allies were foreign invaders. For them, the true citizens of Bahrain are the Baharana, the 
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Shi’is who inhabited Bahrain before the Al Khalifa conquest. As Gengler notes, this 
narrative along with the utopian portrayal of “ancient Bahrain” has long been a powerful 
narrative among Bahraini Shi’is.104 
It is important to note that neither of these definitions of Bahraini identity made any 
place for the Huwala and the ‘Ajam, who made up as much as 20 percent of Bahrain’s 
citizenry
105
 The Huwala are nontribal Sunnis from the Arabian Peninsula and the ‘Ajam 
immigrants from Iran, many of whom are also Sunni. Although neither of these groups was 
included in the origin myths described above, many of these families have lived in Bahrain 
for decades or even centuries. Although these groups have traditionally been allied with 
the government, and many of them are clients of patrons within the royal family, they are 
excluded from the inner circle of political power.
106
 
Interestingly, although al-Wifaq’s leadership and core membership were composed 
by the Bahama, they have chosen not to invoke the myth of “ancient Bahrain” during the 
uprising. Instead, it described itself as defending the citizens of Bahrain against the tyranny 
of the royal family. This allowed them to seek and claim a wider constituency, while 
appealing to the nationalistic fervor stirred up by the other Arab uprisings. Of course, this 
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could be seen as a Shi’i agenda, since anything that moved Bahrain closer to a true 
representative democracy must empower the majority. Nevertheless, Al-Wifaq argued that 
a more democratic government would improve the political climate for all groups. The fact 
that it led a coalition that has included Sunnis and ‘Ajam demonstrates that it has been 
successful in broadening its membership beyond the Shi’i community. 
In Bahrain, citizenship can only be granted by royal decree, making the King the 
final arbiter of who is and who is not a citizen, and events in the beginning of the uprising 
have shown that the King can also strip citizenship from those citizens who have been 
convicted of working against the state.
107 According to Amnesty International, 31 Bahrainis 
had been stripped of their citizenship for “damage to state security” between 2011 and 
2013. This implied that citizenship is determined not by ethnicity, but by behavior.  
This conception of citizenship had implications for the national dialogue. By the 
logic that the king has authority to strip someone’s citizenship, the moment a citizen started 
acting against the government he stops being a citizen. Therefore, the government was 
under no obligation to listen to the grievances of those acting against them. This also put a 
different interpretation on the claims of pro-government editorialists that members of the 
Shi’i-led opposition were not true Bahrainis. 
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It is also important to remember that not all Bahraini political movements were 
represented in the dialogue. The “Sunni and Shi’i opposition groups” did not represent all 
Sunnis and Shi’is. Many Bahrainis’ saw the revolution not in the dialogue chamber but on 
the streets in protests and in clashes with the security forces. They described their actions 
as “sacred defense,” but the government, particularly the conservative faction of the Royal 
family, viewed them as terrorists. This tension, and the way it was described, is the subject 




Chapter 2: Terrorists, Freedom Fighters, and the Terrorist State 
On July 18, 2013, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot of a mosque yards away 
from the Royal family’s palace in Riffa, south of the capital.
108
 In its claim of responsibility, 
the militant group Saraya al-Ashtar described the attack as a symbolic victory against the 
regime at its very gates. Though no one was killed or injured, this symbolic victory for a 
previously obscure militant group marked a turning point in the discussion of terrorism in 
Bahrain.  
As a term, terrorism is both powerful and ambiguous. It is also one of the most 
contested words in the discourse of the Bahraini uprising. When the government and its 
media outlets use the term terrorism they are most often referring to the acts of the February 
14 Youth Coalition. When February 14 itself, or the al-Wifaq coalition refer to terrorists 
they are most likely referencing the government’s own security forces. Each group has 
considered themselves to be the true Bahrainis, so those that their use of violence was 
justified. Therefore, February 14 considered themselves to be defending themselves against 
a foreign occupation, and the government considered themselves to be fighting “terrorists.” 
Al-Wifaq was caught between these two groups and unsuccessfully tried to take a moderate 
position. 
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While the government has raised concerns about terrorism since February 2011, the 
degree of concern the pro-government media expressed has depended on events, and 
depended on which faction of the Royal family to which they were linked. The public’s 
fear of terrorism provided justification for the conservative faction of the royal family’s 
security solutions to Bahrain’s problems, so the members of this faction emphasized the 
role of terrorists, and the government’s official statements and press coverage were likely 
to describe the opposition through the lens of terrorism if they were affiliated with the 
Royal family’s conservatives. 
TERRORISM DISCOURSE AND CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES  
Critical scholars explain these terms in the context of “intrastate terrorism.”109 The 
terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” do not describe a particular type of activity, but rather the 
status of the perpetrators in relationship to the state or other groups in power. This 
distinction explains how states with an official policy of not negotiating with terrorists can 
end up negotiating in practice with them. As soon as the government decides to negotiate 
with the designated group, they stop being “terrorists.”110 This dynamic was evidenced in 
the example of opposition actions after the Riffa bombing. At this time the government 
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instituted a new, broader terrorism bill, and several acts that were not previously terrorism 
became designated as such. 
Dixit has written that the government’s use of the word terrorism to describe a 
domestic insurgency varies as the government clashes or negotiates with them.111 This can 
be seen in Bahrain: the government’s discourse on the opposition varies according to the 
outlook for the government’s national dialogue. Since the February 14 youth coalition is 
the group of the unofficial opposition, the government most commonly labeled them as 
“terrorists.” It is important to examine the context in which February 14 arose and describe 
its supporters and goals. 
THE APPEARANCE OF THE FEBRUARY 14 YOUTH COALITION 
On March 16, 2011, Bahraini security forces cleared thousands of protesters from 
the Pearl roundabout using tear gas and police tanks. Once it was clear, they demolished 
the iconic Pearl Monument and the traffic circle on which it stood with bulldozers. This 
destruction symbolized the beginning of a government offensive against protesters, which 
culminated in the occupation of Bahrain by the Gulf Cooperative Council’s Peninsula 
Shield Force (mainly made up of Saudi Arabian troops) and the imposition of the State of 
National Safety, which placed the country under martial law. 
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It was in this context in April 2011 that the February 14 Youth Coalition launched 
its Facebook page. 
112
At first, this organization’s efforts resembled those of other political 
groups such as the Bahrain Center for Human rights, primarily documenting destruction 
and injuries resulting from the security crackdown and attempting to raise awareness. The 
documentary efforts focused specifically on Shi’i villages such as Sitra and Karbadad, Shi’i 
villages which were particular targets during the crackdown. However, after a few weeks 
in operation, the authors of the February 14 page began to post manifestoes, schedules for 
protests, and professional-looking posters which protesters could print out and carry during 
demonstrations.  
The organization’s logo became a ubiquitous sight at protests in many villages.
113 
At the same time, Shi’i youth began to retaliate against the crackdown by barricading roads 
and burning tires. These activities became linked with the February 14 branded protests, 
and the authors of the Facebook page confirmed this link by documenting and praising the 
“resistance” effort of the saboteurs.
114 The acts of civil disobedience were sporadic at first, 
but the roadblocks became more common after protests commemorating the first 
anniversary of the uprising, and these disruptive acts led increasingly to clashes with the 
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security forces. Young revolutionaries were frequently injured or killed during these 
confrontations, and their martyrdom led to retaliation by their comrades. 
As the violence on both sides escalated the government became increasingly 
concerned about “terrorism.” The roadblocks and acts of sabotage had spread to the 
Budaiya Highway, a major artery that you next the capital with the southern part of the 
island, and many of the businesses that once lined the highway closed. The conservative 
factions the royal family increasingly denounced the terrorist acts that were “disrupting the 
security of Bahrain and endangering its way of life.”
115
 
THE RIFFA BOMBING, THE GOVERNMENT’S REACTION AND THE SUNNI OPPOSITION 
The Riffa bombing in July 2013 marked a hardening in the government’s attitude 
toward February 14’s activities. Before this event, the government sometimes referred to 
the tire burning, road barricading and Molotov cocktail attacks as riots, vandalism, or 
hooliganism.
116
 These terms underplayed the seriousness of these activities, while 
highlighting the success of government reconciliation efforts. In the wake of the bombing, 
the government took a more confrontational stance towards terrorism, both legally and 
rhetorically. In fact, the broadening of the definition of terrorism under Bahrain’s new 
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terrorism laws meant that acts that were not previously terrorist became terrorism. Many 
conservatives saw this as an indictment of the moderates’ political strategy of negotiation 
with the opposition. 
117
 Conservatives and conservative columnists criticized the efforts at 
a political solution as merely a cover for the government’s inability to put down the riots. 
The Sunni opposition agreed with this view. Many Sunni protesters shouted “we want the 
Prime Minister,” asking for harsher position towards the opposition. 
118 This view, 
expressed in the official statements of TNGOU was that the Shi’i opposition was being 
rewarded for its bad behavior, and that even allowing the Shi’is to air their grievances had 
not stopped the protesting. For them, these terrorist acts were a sign that the Shi’is were 
undeserving, and should be “sent back to Iran.”
119
 
Therefore, the government faced the challenge of how to emphasize the seriousness 
of the terrorist threat while at the same time demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
government response. The seriousness of the threat was intended to justify the government 
crackdown, but at the same time it made the government appear weak in the face of 
opposition, exposing them to criticism by TGNOU and other Sunni groups. 
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The government’s new, harsher position on February 14 was explicitly outlined in 
a short documentary produced by the Ministry of the Interior for the state broadcaster, 
Bahrain TV. 
120
 This video portrayed February 14 as a paramilitary organization similar to 
Hezbollah, showing clips of figures in masks and February 14 T-shirts marching in 
formation with flags emblazoned with February 14 logos. It also showed February 14 as 
an Islamist organization by showing members holding Qurans. The group is depicted as 
radical and organized and, in its masks, frighteningly anonymous. 
It also showed flowcharts and maps demonstrating the structure and international 
reach of the organization. The video depicted links between the February 14 organizations 
and Hezbollah, Iraqi Islamist groups, and Iran.
121 It also claimed that February 14 members 
get weapons training in Iraq and Iran, and that this training is organized by exiled 
opposition figure Hassan Musha’ima. It is portrayed as a “Bahraini Hezbollah” an Iran-
funded religiously motivated militia. The video also outlined all of the bombings in Bahrain 
since 2011, implying the February 14 is behind all of these, and behind the groups that 
claimed responsibility for the bombings. 
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In each case, it described the Ministry of Interior’s response to the bombings and 
showed names and pictures of those who were arrested for the crimes.
122
 This showed that 
despite the formidable depiction of February 14, the Ministry of the Interior was capable 
of dealing with it. It also argued that the new powers given the government under the 
antiterrorism law have been effective. 
The videos also showed piles of homemade guns and other improvised weapons.
123 
The prospect of weapons in the hands the Shi’is was particularly unnerving to their 
opponents because the number of casualties in Bahrain remained very low, since most 
Bahrainis did not have access to firearms. Furthermore, Bahrain’s extremely strict gun 
control laws have ensured that the security forces had a major advantage over the violent 
opposition groups that precluded any attempt to take over the government by force. The 
appearance of improvised guns suggested-, at least in the minds of those who saw Shi’is 
as a threat- that the clashes in Bahrain’s streets could become much more violent and that 
this could lead to the sort of civil war experienced in Syria.
124
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In this depiction, terrorists were not just criminals, but soldiers in a foreign-backed 
transnational army. Furthermore, government media emphasized that this group 
represented an unprecedented danger to the state. The government implicitly argued that 
by committing violent acts, February 14, and by extension the rest of the Shi’i opposition 
revealed itself as an agent of foreign powers, specifically Iran and Hezbollah. 
The bombings, some of which killed police officers, overshadowed peaceful 
protests in the national and international discourse on the uprising. Since the beginning of 
the dialogue, discussion of political solution and dominated in press coverage of the 
political situation. On the day after the bombing, The English-language newspaper Gulf 
Daily News published a front-page spread of government statements on terrorism, 
including a thundering denunciation by the crown prince, and many statements by the king 
and prime minister. 
125 Following this remarkable display of royal family unanimity, the 
parliament passed a new and more stringent counterterrorism law.
126 Justin Gengler and 
other commentators described the Riffa bombing and subsequent fallout as a victory for 
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A profile of the organization from the opposition news website Manama Voice, 
countered, saying that this view the group as an outpouring of the “popular will” that was 
present at the Pearl Roundabout, and frustrated by the subsequent crackdown.
128
 It 
described February 14 leadership as ordinary citizens who stepped forward in the country’s 
moment of need. 
THE PEARL CHARTER AND SACRED DEFENSE 
For its part, the February 14 Youth Coalition considers itself a patriotic movement 
that sought to liberate Bahrain from foreign influence particularly the Al Khalifa. Its views 
were outlined in the “Pearl Charter,” an alternative to the official opposition’s “Manama 
Document.” This document was posted anonymously on the primary February 14 
Facebook page, and signed only with the name of the February 14 Youth Coalition.
129  
In this case, as with most of the statements, videos, and posters attributed to 
February 14, it is impossible to determine authorship. It was not even clear whether the 
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Facebook page and its contents were the product of one person or an organized 
revolutionary leadership. Because of these questions, when discussing the ideology of the 
February 14 Youth Coalition I use the term “February 14” to refer to anyone who identified 
himself or herself as a member of February 14 either in a statement or by using one of the 
organization symbols are poster or a profile picture on the social media page. Given the 
immense amount of material available on the Internet, however, I focused mainly on items 
published on the oldest and most established February 14 Facebook page or on the 
February 14 Media Center page, which appeared to be closely affiliated with the original 
page and shared similar content.
130
  
In the Pearl Charter, February 14 professed many of the same democratic principles 
as al-Wifaq’s coalition, but it bluntly called for the “overthrow the regime.”
131
 It also 
emphasized the importance of “sacred defense principles, the protection of honors, defy 
oppression and repelling aggressors, based on the verse: whomever [sic] attacks you, attack 
him the same way he attacked you.”
132  
The issue of the future political system was dismissed with the phrase “the peoples 
right of self-determination and giving them choice of any political system they agree on 
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(Constitutional Monarchy, Republic, etc.,) that will satisfy the people [sic] ambitions and 
needs.”
133 On the other hand, the details of the sacred defense plan took up three pages. 
The form of the document demonstrated that February 14’s primary concern was with the 
day-to-day defense of their villages against security forces, rather than any eventual 
political solution to the conflict. For them it was not about reforming the political system, 
it was about overthrowing the government. 
The Pearl Charter also represented a recognition of the fact that there would not be 
a comparatively swift victory for the opposition, such as an Egypt and Tunisia. It also 
implied that it would be a long struggle against the government that needed to be properly 
organized. Finally, it demonstrated the authors desire to contextualize each small-scale 
struggle within the narrative of the “revolution.” most importantly, it countered the 
assertion, frequently made by the government, that the crisis was over and everything in 
Bahrain was fine.
134




The phrase “sacred defense,” which is the subject heading in the Pearl Charter, and 
frequently repeated phrase, is linked to the history of Iran’s defense in the face of an Iraqi 
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invasion. The imagery of Bahrain’s protest posters draws upon some of the same Shi’i 
imagery, including the hand that is the symbol of the Ahl al-Bayt, or the family of the 
prophet.
136 This symbol was a common icon in the revolution in Iran, particularly during 
the Iran-Iraq war. On February 14 posters, the symbol was surrounded by a circle of barbed 
wire, which is resting on to crossed swords. 
137
 
Some of the posters used very explicit Shi’i language, such as “Hussein, an example 
for revolutionaries.”
138 Another read: “Karbala is our revolution.” 
139 Similarly, photos and 
videos of February 14 protests showed demonstrators wearing shrouds emblazoned with 
the February 14 logo.
140 The shrouds symbolized their willingness to die for their cause 
and associated with the celebration of ‘Ashura. 
All of these symbols were powerful rallying points for Bahrain Shi’is and they 
demonstrated that February 14 considered itself a Shi’i movement. Since February 14 
described itself as the standard-bearer of Bahrain’s revolution, this meant that, in their 
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view, it was a Shi’i revolution. When February 14 talked about “the people” or “Bahrainis” 
they meant the Shi’is. 
Government supporters, particularly the journalists working for the Al Watan 
newspaper took the Shi’i rhetoric as a sign that the members of February 14 Youth 
Coalition were Iranian agents. However, this imagery had power for Shi’is around the 
world, not just those who supported Iran, and it could also be a powerful mobilizing tool 
for an anonymous, relatively new organization like February 14. 
Although February 14 asserted its commitment to peaceful protest, it used 
confrontational, often military, words and images on the posters it regularly publishes on 
its Facebook page. Each of the posters featured the name of the week’s “campaign.”
141 The 
phrase sacred defense was used seven times in 2013, others reference the battle of Karbala, 
“Manama storm,” and “the days of the martyrs,” “steadfast and rebellious,” “Zainab’s 
revolution.” 142 The titles of a series of campaigns also used the word occupy, as in “occupy 
Manama” and “occupy Budayia.”
143 This was obviously a reference to the worldwide 
occupy movement, whose use of social media and lack of central organization, was an 
inspiration to many Arab Spring movements. However, the word occupy also had a military 
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connotation, and a connection to the February 14 Youth Coalition’s characterization of 
Saudi forces’ presence in Bahrain as an occupation. 
Many of February 14’s slogans implied a comparison between the Bahraini 
government and the Saudi forces in Bahrain and Israeli occupation forces in Palestine. 
They described some of their protest campaigns as Bahraini “intifada." They also signed 
their infrequent official statements as “from occupied Bahrain.” 
144
 Furthermore, one of 
their most popular posters is posed in a way that echoes a famous photograph of a 
Palestinian child confronting an Israeli tank.
145 Given the hostility to Israel in the Arab 
world, comparing Bahrain’s government to it was an uncompromising statement. 
The main February 14 Facebook page and many of its imitators also feature videos 
of actual tire fires and clashes with the police, demonstrating that “sacred defense” is not 
just rhetoric. These videos also serve as memorials to the fighters of the “continuing 
revolution.” 
146
 The presence of barricades and large crowds of protesters on a major 
highway or in the capital forced the population to acknowledge that the revolution 
continued. Its ability to gather large crowds also demonstrates that the organization has an 
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existence outside of Facebook, and raised profile in comparison to the other opposition 
groups. 
All of this rhetoric demonstrated that February 14 saw itself as fighting a war on 
behalf of citizens against an illegitimate “foreign” government. It justified its violence as 
legitimate self-defense against a foreign occupation that described not only the occupation 
of the Peninsula Shield Force, but also the Al Khalifas. The imagery of its posters in the 
rhetoric of its slogans make the argument that the Al Khalifas’ rule of Bahrain is a century-
long occupation. They are not true Bahrainis, both because they came originally from the 
Najaf, and because they are not Shi’i.  
At the same time, February 14’s rhetoric suggested that its members were “more 
Bahraini” than other Bahraini Shi’is because they lived in the countryside like the Shi’is in 
“Ancient Bahrain.” They also see themselves as having suffered more under the Al Khalifa 
government and fighting harder for the revolution. In their view, this made them better 
Bahrainis than parliamentarians who are willing to negotiate with the government. 
SARAYA AL-ASHTAR AND BAHRAIN FIST 
After the Riffa bombing, a group calling itself Saraya al-Ashtar claimed 
responsibility.
147
 According to a posted statement, they were not intending to target the 
mosque, but rather the nearby Royal Court, as a demonstration that revolutionaries could 
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reach even to the heart of royal power. The statement also claimed that the bombing was 
“in defense of the honor of” Rehana al-Mosawi, a woman who was strip-searched by police 
after being arrested for allegedly involvement in the plot to bomb the Bahraini Formula 
One race in 2012.
148
 This violation of female honor sparked large protests by all of 
Bahrain’s opposition groups and a statement by that called on Bahrainis to “defend the 
honor of the woman of Bahrain.”
149 For this group, the revelation of their religious as well 
as a political cause. 
Saraya al-Ashtar also claimed responsibility for a few other bombings in several 
attacks on policemen in Shi’i villages. Their statements all had heavy religious overtones 
including frequent quotations from the Quran. The group also refers to itself as “men of 
God.” This religious language distinguishes Saraya al-Ashtar’s statements from those of 
February 14. February 14 occasionally references religious events such as ‘Ashura or 
religious concepts such as martyrdom, but in more frequently described as a struggle in 
secular terms as a military operation or a struggle for “human rights.” In February 14 
statements, religions the imagery is implied. In Saraya al-Ashtar’s statements it was used 
directly 
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Another group which linked itself with Saraya al-Ashtar, at least rhetorically, was 
Bahrain Fist. It describes itself on its Twitter bio in these words: “Fist is a level of rebellion 
which began on January 24, 2012 to crush and deter Hamad’s mercenaries. This stage is 
considered the core of the rebellion in Bahrain.” This description was superimposed over 
a picture of Crown Prince some on over the caption “the Salman dialogue does not 
represent me” in English and Arabic.
150 The group launched in January 2012 with a video 
announcing its intention to “crush” the “mercenaries” if they target the entrance of villages. 151 
Blockading the entrances to villages with police cars are tanks was a common police response to 
protests in the Shi’i villages, so Bahrain Fist’s plan would guarantee clashes with the police. They 
also advocated the use of Molotov cocktails far more directly and openly than February 14. 
The group’s inaugural video emphasized that they were endorsed by February 14. They, in 
turn, endorsed and frequently praised Saraya al-Ashtar on their Twitter account, addressing 
them as “men of God,” and adding “may God grant you victory.”
152
 Like Saraya al-Ashtar, 
Bahrain Fist frequently referenced the Quran and uses religious language in its statements 
and tweets. 
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A third group, Media Center of the Revolution in Bahrain, released a video on 
February 13, 2014 showing people and masks assembling a bomb, in room full of Molotov 
cocktails. The video also used religious imagery. The opening shot shows a Koran open to 
Surah al-Anfal (The Spoils of War).
153
 A shot at the end of the video showed the banners 
of several of Bahrain the unofficial opposition societies including, Alliance for a Republic 
(i.e. the Bahrain Freedom Movement, al-Haq Movement, and al-Wafa’ Islamic Party), the Youth 
Coalition of the February 14th, the Salvation Movement, and the Islamic Action Society (al-
‘Amal).154 Thus, the Media Center of the Revolution in Bahrain, which seems to mainly 
produce and distribute videos appears to be claiming that these unofficial opposition groups 
supported and intended to carry out a bombing campaign on February 14, 2014.
155
 
Saraya al-Ashtar and Bahrain Fist and the growing number of groups like them took 
a position on the situation in Bahrain similar to February 14, but they espoused violence 
and used religious imagery to a much greater degree. While February 14 described itself 
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as a self-defense and resistance movement, these other groups were waging war on them 
in the name of God. 
AL-WIFAQ, FEBRUARY 14, AND VIOLENCE 
Al-Wifaq had an equivocal relationship with February 14. On the one hand, its 
confrontational methods were directly contrary to al-Wifaq’s own policies, represents a 
challenge to its leadership. On the other hand, February 14 was a considerable force in the 
opposition particularly among Shi’i youth. Furthermore, the continuous disruption caused 
by February 14 has forced the government to at least appear to consider opposition 
demands. Therefore al-Wifaq did not want to risk denouncing February 14 and its methods 
and losing this leverage. 
In late January 2013, al-Wifaq’s spiritual leader Sheikh Isa al-Qasim issued a 
statement, described as a fatwa that declared that “terrorism is against Islam.”
156 The 
statement was likely a response to frequent demands by the government that al-Wifaq 
denounce violence. 
157 However, the statement condemned terrorism rather than violence, 
and was ignored February 14 that did not consider its tactics to be terrorism. In fact, an 
earlier statement by al-Qasim seemed to encourage sacred defense tactics: “Whoever you 
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see abusing women, you must crush them.” 
158 This call was likely linked to an incident in the 
village of Eker, in which police apparently struck women who were attempting to prevent 
the man’s arrest.
159 Al-Qasim made a virtually identical statement – sometimes also 
described as a fatwa – in July 2013 in the wake of the arrest of Rehana al-Mousawi.
160
 Pro-
government sources pointed to this “fatwa” as the driving force behind the Riffa bombing. 
Twitter statements by Ali Salman clarified that al-Wifaq only condoned violence as self-
defense in situations where the attack had clearly been established or when violations of property 
had occurred. 161 He emphasized al-Wifaq’s commitment to peaceful protest, but added that when 
violence, was justifiable to defend oneself. Of course, the term “self-defense” may be as elastic as 
the term “terrorism.” 162 
The contentious role of religious rhetoric and the way it was used by different groups these 
also demonstrated that the importance of religious identity in Bahrain. Although al-Wifaq generally 
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chose not to use religious language in its statements, it is an Islamist group and its relationship with 
al-Qasim contributed to its influence. Thus, the other groups that employed religious language were 
competing with al-Wifaq for religious legitimation. 
Regardless of al-Qasim’s and al-Wifaq’s intentions, the elasticity of the term terrorism 
allowed every groups to read what they wanted to into the statement condemning it. 
Nevertheless, the statement did represent an implicit acknowledgment that terrorism 
interest in Bahrain and as a problem. It was also a more outspoken denunciation that the 
statement issued after the bombing in Riffa, which suggested that the bombing was 
fabricated. 
Nevertheless, the careful wording of al-Wifaq’s statement on these issues also 
refrained from condemning February 14 and other violent groups either implicitly or 
explicitly. These groups, February 14 or particular represented a powerful force, 
particularly among Bahranah from the villages, who are important part of al-Wifaq’s 
support base. 
While al-Wifaq never mentioned February 14 by name in any of its statements, or 
referenced any of its activities, it claimed members of February 14 as part of the opposition 
it represented when giving details of arrests, deaths, and prosecutions. Members of 
February 14, since they confronted the police directly and violently were frequently 
arrested, it was likely that a large percentage of the students under arrest, whose cause al-
Wifaq has energetically taken up are members of February 14. Al-Wifaq is only willing to 
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Furthermore, al-Wifaq was in very difficult position because of its lack control over 
February 14. Implicit in the dialogue was the promise on the part of the opposition to bring 
an end to protest if its demands were met. However, given the disconnect between al-Wifaq 
and February 14, it was unlikely that it would be able to convince February 14 to stop 
protesting. This was likely one of the reasons by al-Wifaq’s refusal to condemn violence 
directly, this leadership knew that their statements were likely be ignored. Similarly, the 
presence of violent partisans on the street also kept up the pressure on the on the 
government as al-Wifaq made its demands. 
STATE TERRORISM 
Although al-Wifaq addressed the accusations of terrorism made against the 
opposition in one statement, more frequently they dismissed account terrorist violence as 
an attempt to discredit the opposition. One statement was titled “The Old Story of Terror 
Cells Is Boring.”
164 The statement went on to allege that, “the regime did not show a single 
evidence to prove its doubtful accusations. All that it provided were merely coerced 
confessions, which have been taken under torture. This old scenario is being repeated every 
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 The vast majority of al-Wifaq’s statements that discussed terrorism dealt with 
state terror. Some statements accused the government of some of the systemic terrorism by 
authorizing crackdowns on peaceful protesters and imposing security cordons and villages. 
In the words of one statement, this “terrorist” crackdown arose from a “destructive despotic 
mentality has been the strongest and is dominating the country steering towards security 
escalation amid absence of a real political project.”
166 Another statement described the 
conservative faction within the government “official terror cell.”
167
 Other statements 
focused on individual acts of violence by policemen. Stories that policeman were throwing 
Molotov cocktails at protesters provoked particular outrage on opposition social media 
because Molotov cocktails became a symbol of opposition terrorism which has been 
frequently denounced by the government.
168 This raised a difficult question for al-Wifaq: 
why were they negotiating with a “terrorist government?” 
PRO-GOVERNMENT VIGILANTISM 
While the government’s emphasis on the terrorist nature of the opposition gives 
them legal support, this also leaves them open to criticism for continually failing to prevent 
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terrorist acts. This concern with security issues has become a rallying point for the Sunni 
opposition particularly TNGOU and the al-Fatih Youth Coalition.  
The al-Fatih Youth Coalition was a more militant offshoot of TNGOU, loosely 
organized by means of social media in a similar way to February 14.
169 Although the 
group’s manifesto professed goals similar to those of al-Wifaq and its allies. This group 
apparently clashed violently with Shi’i protest groups in the street and administered 
vigilante justice. “Al-Fatih” is a reference to the conquest of Bahrain by the Al Khalifa, 
and in Arabic can also refer to the opening of the country to Islam, so the term was very 
offensive to the country’s Shi’is. The groups still regularly publish statements condemning 
the Shi’i opposition on its blog, but it appeared to be less active in the streets since the end 
of 2012. The spring and summer of 2012 were a particularly active time for pro-
government vigilantes. Numerous videos posted to social media reported attacks on 
protesters. Social media reports indicated another rise in vigilante violence in summer and 
early fall 2013, culminating in the firebombing of al-Wifaq’s headquarters in September. 
Al-Wifaq’s statement reported that it was graffitied with “pro-regime slogans.”170 This 
conflict between citizens contributed greatly to sectarian tension in Bahrain, as both sides 
considered the government unjustly favored the opposing sect. 
                                                          
169 Justin Gengler, "Are Bahrain’s Sunnis Still Awake?" Sada, June 25, 2012, accessed October 3, 2013, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/25/are-bahrain-s-sunnis-still-awake/caoa. 
170
 Al-Wifaq, "Summary of a Statement by al-Wifaq National Islamic Society Secretary General 'Ali 
Salman about Recent Development in Bahrain's Political Arena," news release, August 19, 2013, accessed 
November 29, 2013  
 
 69 
TERRORISM, SELF-DEFENSE, AND LAW AND ORDER 
The government and the pro-government media in Bahrain increasingly tended to 
portray the opposition as a whole and particularly unofficial opposition groups such as 
February 14 as terrorists. This increasing focus on terrorism and security in Bahrain helped 
support the perspective of the conservative faction in the royal family. They had always 
advocated a crackdown as the ideal solution notable conservatives and when the Ministry 
of the Interior (responsible for the police) and the commander-in-chief of the Bahrain 
Defense Forces, both of them likely gained power as they became more prominent in 
dealing with the crisis. 
At the same time, the emphasis on the continuing security threat led to criticism by 
Sunni opposition groups. They perceived the government as not doing enough to prevent 
these terrorist acts. This perception of government inadequacy has led to dozens of 
vigilante attacks on protesters and other Shi’is, although the exact magnitude and scope of 
vigilantism has been difficult to determine. 
Some opposition groups, most notably February 14, did espouse violence is an 
extension of their civil disobedience campaigns although they do not consider it to be 
terrorism. They described their acts as sacred defense, violence made necessary by the 
unprovoked aggression of the police against peaceful protesters. February 14 also appeared 
to be linked, at least rhetorically, with groups that more openly advocated the use of bombs 
and improvised firearms to attack police, and do so in religiously charged language. 
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Al-Wifaq’s response to the violence was ambivalent. Although they denounced 
terrorism as un-Islamic, they endorsed the use of violence for self-defense, particularly the 
defense of women, and they routinely campaigned for the release of members of February 
14 who been arrested, and described them as “prisoners of conscience.” While al-Wifaq 
disapproved of February 14’s methods, particularly as they make al-Wifaq’s goal of a 
negotiated settlement more difficult, they recognize the power and appeal of the group 
among Shi’is. Furthermore, maintaining a good relationship with February 14 and its 
constituents would have been vital to persuading people to abide by any settlement al-
Wifaq achieved. Whether al-Wifaq retained any authority over February 14 and its 
supporters was uncertain; however, al-Wifaq needed to appear to maintain control in order 
to retain that the relevance as leader of the opposition. 
Since both the government and some factions of the opposition in Bahrain used 
violence, the question of terrorism is really a matter of legitimacy. If Bahrain’s government 
was legitimate than the violent acts against it were terrorism, but if it was an illegitimate 
occupying force than these violent acts could be considered a struggle for liberation. In 
order to make the case that the government was illegitimate, February 14 made the 
argument that only indigenous Baharana are true Bahrainis. On the other hand, both the 
government and the Sunni opposition argued that the use of violence in and of itself made 
groups is such as February 14 illegitimate. Al-Wifaq was caught in the middle of this 
conflict since it agrees with many of the positions of the unofficial opposition but it was a 
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reminder argue that the government is illegitimate. The issue of who had the right to use 




Chapter 3: Expatriates and Citizens 
On March 14, 2011, 14 men gathered outside of an apartment building in Manama, 
Bahrain, that housed Pakistani workers, and called to the residents to come out. When no 
one answered, the men proceeded to break down doors and drag out the Pakistanis inside, 
shouting: “You Pakistanis come here and work in the security forces. We will kill all 
Pakistanis! Go back to being a laborer!”
171
 
This story, told to Human Rights Watch researchers by one of the survivors, marked 
a low point in the relationship between Bahrainis and the expatriate workers who make up 
more than 40 percent of the population and over 60 percent of the labor force.
172 Expatriate 
workers have been an important part of Bahrain’s economy since oil was discovered in 
1932, and their presence has continually raised concern about their effect on national 
culture and their danger to national security. However, the Shi’i uprising that began in 
February 2011 highlighted the religious differences between the expatriate and the majority 
of citizens, and the role of expatriates as a tool of the government. Bahrain’s government 
reported that gangs of Shi’is killed four Southeast Asian workers and injured 88 more 
during the government crackdown on opposition protesters March 13 and 14, and pro-
government media reported dozens of later attacks. Since the government made 
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considerable political capital of its role as a protector of “poor migrants,” the statistics may 
be exaggerated, but international human rights organizations have confirmed several 
incidents.
173
 Citing these examples, the official media characterized the opposition as 
intolerant religious extremists. This raised an interesting question: how did both the 
government and the opposition frame the issue of expatriate workers, given the importance 
of Bahraini identity to the discourses after the uprising? 
EXPATRIATES AND THE ECONOMY IN BAHRAIN 
The oil discovered in Bahrain in the 1936 brought wealth. It also brought a frenzy 
of building and modernization, which required the import of thousands of cheap, low-skill 
workers. Now, facing the imminent exhaustion of its oil fields, Bahrain attempted to build 
a finance industry from scratch, which requires them to imported educated and experienced 
professionals, many of them from India.
174
 In 1989 the government began several 
initiatives for increasing the number of citizens in the workforce, known as 
“Bahrainization,” but the salaries that citizens demanded were so much higher than those 
that expatriate workers would accept that there is little incentive for business owners to 
employ nationals.
175
 This became problematic because as Bahrain’s oil wealth decreased, 
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Bahrain diversified its economy, becoming a center of finance and international business. 
The multinational corporations that have moved into Bahrain have recruited their own 
expatriates. 
The majority of expatriate workers in Bahrain were Sunni Muslims from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.
176
 Many of these were laborers, domestic 
workers, or small shopkeepers. Some Indians occupied managerial positions in the private 
sector, and Pakistanis, in particular, were notorious as members of the security forces.
177 
The government did not reveal how many members of the security forces were expatriates, 
but among the opposition it became a truism that the riot police are Pakistani. Also, while 
the government apparently gave citizenship to some Pakistani members of the security 
forces opposition columnists and spokespeople made the rhetorical assumption that the 
government gives citizenship all of them.  
The existing literature on expatriates in the Gulf describes a fear of cultural 
“asianization” and a resulting hostility towards expatriates that did not seem to be present 
in Bahrain’s media in the period I studied.
178 This seemed remarkable given the prominence 
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of the discourse on “foreignness” in Bahrain. However, expatriates made up less than 50 
percent of the population of Bahrain, as opposed to more than 80 percent in the UAE 
therefore, although expatriates make up a large proportion of Bahrain’s population and an 
even larger proportion of its workforce Bahrain did not have the sense of being completely 
surrounded by foreigners. 
Bahrain’s uprising created a dynamic that was unusual in the Gulf. The government 
and its supporters in the Sunni community saw themselves as aligned with expatriates 
against their Shi’i citizens. Shi’i members of the opposition, both al-Wifaq and the 
unofficial opposition saw expatriates as the enemy. They were further outraged by the fact 
that expatriates seem to have more access to economic opportunities and more of the 
governments respect than “true Bahraini citizens.” It is important to note that even if 
foreign-born residents gain citizenship Shi’is at least considered them “expatriates.” 
When the expatriate labor system of the Gulf was designed, planners always 
assumed that the expatriates’ presence would be temporary. They would come to Bahrain 
for a construction project or would work in domestic service for a few years and then return 
home. However, in Bahrain, as in the rest of the Gulf, many expatriates lived there for their 
entire lives, but they had almost no chance at citizenship or permanent residency. Bahrain 
was the only country in the Gulf that offered citizenship to expatriates, and because it was 
unusual, it was seen by many Shi’is as part of a plot to change Bahrain’s demographics. 
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Human rights organizations regarded Bahrain as the most progressive of the Gulf 
countries in regard to immigration and labor issues. Of all the Gulf States, Bahrain was the 
least dependent on foreign labor, but it was still dependent in many areas. The Bahrain 
2030 report, released by the Crown Prince’s Economic Development Board, described the 
skilled expatriate population as one of Bahrain’s competitive advantages. Expatriate 
professionals from India and the Levant have been important to building Bahrain’s 
financial and tourism sectors.  
In 2009, Bahrain reformed its traditional Kafala system of sponsorship, according 
to which each worker’s visa was dependent on a sponsor, to a system in which the majority 
of sponsorships were held by a government agency, the Labor Market Regulatory 
Authority.
179 Human Rights Watch and other international organizations praised the step, 
but called for the protection to be expanded to domestic workers, who were the most 
vulnerable to exploitation by their sponsors. The activist organization the Bahrain Center 
for Human Rights was more critical of the government reforms, arguing that the reforms 
are merely cosmetic and that the government refused almost all applications to change jobs 
and ignored complaints about employers.
180
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Since 2009, the government had promised further reforms, but as of 2014, these 
reforms of not been enacted. Although the government has passed laws restricting child 
labor and human and sex trafficking these issues continued to be prominent.
181 
Nevertheless, government spokespeople tended to cite the labor reforms as a counter to al-
Wifaq’s coalition’s argument that the government was not interested in human rights. Thus, 
this expatriate labor reform allowed Bahrain’s government to demonstrate that they were 
a modern and progressive state that cared about human rights. 
Innocent Victims or Loyal Defenders 
The Gulf Daily News newspaper targeted an expatriate audience and covered their 
issues extensively. It published many articles praising the labor reforms, but also published 
instances of exploitation and neglect. Although pro-government in its political coverage, it 
can be extremely critical of government policies in regard to issues dealing with 
expatriates. It also frequently celebrated the expatriate populations of Bahrain by 
describing cultural events. The Gulf Daily News’ expatriate focus was not surprising given 
that the majority of its journalists were also Indian or Arab expatriates. 
In general, the rest of the pro-government media did not discuss expatriates except 
as victims of the opposition’s violence. These articles argued that the opposition’s 
                                                          
181
 Human Rights Watch, For a Better Life, publication (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2012), 




victimization of expatriates belied the human rights ideals that al-Wifaq’s coalition 
espoused. They accused Shi’is of “the practice of violence against people with no 
connection to the events, laying waste their rights and humiliating their dignity and shed 
their blood just because they are Asian foreigners,” inverting the opposition’s argument 
about anti-Shi’i discrimination, using nearly the same phrases. These articles further 
defined the government as a defender of human rights by emphasizing the labor reforms 
and safety reforms. In this depiction, expatriates are passive and innocent victims of Shi’i 
aggression in need of the government to protect them. 
In one opinion piece, the author described an expatriate worker who was fined and 
imprisoned for stealing a piece of fruit from a tree.
182 The case provoked outrage, and the 
editorial writer attributed the hard-heartedness of the owner who refused to drop the 
complaint to the “Molotov culture which has nurtured hate (in some villages), inhumanity 
and moral breakdown” since the uprising.
183
 Jones pointed out that the narrative that the 
Shi’i opposition is oppressing the expatriates become so widespread that a columnist could 
blame the Shi’i opposition for completely unrelated miscarriage of justice.
184
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The pro-government media also praised the security forces. In its statements, the 
Ministry of the Interior often described policemen who were killed as “martyrs” or 
“martyrs for duty.”185 Unlike the other expatriates, these police had were described as 
having agency and could choosing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the government. 
The Sunni opposition took this further, holding several recent rallies in support of the police 
and demanding that they be given better protection and be allowed to use lethal weapons.
186 
Thus, the loyal foreigners were contrasted with the disloyal citizens. 
Sunni group TNGOU stated as one of its founding aims that it seeks to implement 
“security and stability for all Bahrainis and expatriates.”
187 They also emphasized the need 
to protect “our brave police officers who faced daily violence in the streets, these men who 
protect all citizens will be can live in peace.”
188
 Despite this emphasis however, that was 
the only TNGOU statement that mentioned expatriates. They view the current unrest as 
conflict between Shi’i citizens and Sunni citizens, with expatriates being largely irrelevant, 
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except as incidental allies. From that perspective, expatriates did not have a stake in the 
current issues.  
EXPATRIATES AND THE SHI’I OPPOSITION 
One of the first demands made in the manifesto that the February 14 Youth 
Coalition published on Facebook was an end to political naturalization. It was also a key 
demand of al-Wifaq’s coalition. An article published by the Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights was accompanied by a short documentary, which claimed to show interviews with 
Saudi expatriates who had illegally obtained Bahraini citizenship.
189
 Under Bahraini law, 
citizenship could be granted to people who were residents of Bahrain for more than five 
years, at the discretion of the government. Several of those interviewed for the video say 
that they gained their citizenship in five months or less. In the video, one of the interviewees 
explained how he obtained Bahraini citizenship for more than 16 of his family members. 
Several of the new citizens in the video mentioned that they voted in recent Bahraini 
election, and one said that he and several of his family members had benefited from free 
government housing. Housing was a particularly sensitive issue, since many Shi’is said 
that they had waited for years to be allocated an apartment. This video argued that these 
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“false citizens,” had no right to citizenship, but had more rights and better representation 
than they did. 
Importantly, the argument that only indigenous people had a right to citizenship 
was not unique to the Bahraini Shi’is and was not purely based on sect. In the rest of the 
Gulf, citizenship was based on ancestry and tribal heritage and there was no way to gain 
citizenship other than being born into it. The argument that the government and supporters 
made that they can grant citizenship to people who were born foreign runs counter to the 
conventional wisdom. 
Another group which opposition writers considered to have gained citizenship 
unfairly was Pakistanis who were granted citizenship because of their service in the 
security forces.
190
 To the opposition, the idea of earning citizenship by oppressing true 
citizens was tragically ironic. These Pakistanis were often described as mercenaries, 
emphasizing the lack of loyalty and commitment to the state. 
191 One writer noted that the 
growth rate of the expatriate population is more than double of the growth rate of citizens, 
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Furthermore, the threats and slogans quoted in the Human Rights Watch report on 
the March 13 and 14 violence indicated that rioters were targeting Pakistanis due to their 
association with the security forces.
193
 An article on the Voice of Bahrain website 
denounced another group seen as pro-government: journalists writing for official 
newspapers. The author described them as “media mercenaries” and noted that their 
profession gives them the perfect opportunity to spy on Shi’is.
194 The editorial writer 
mentioned the names of specific journalists. An article in al-Wasat worried about the 
increasing numbers of expatriate doctors employed in Bahrain’s medical service, a 
profession which the author said, used to be reserved for citizens. The author also expressed 
concern that Bahrainis were dependent on foreigners in such a vital aspect of daily life.
195
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Another thing that provoked outrage, particularly on social media, was Pakistani 
policemen seen breaking into cars during protests or looting stores.
196 Given the frequent 
accusations of criminal behavior against the opposition and the harsh sentences handed out 
for behaviors like protesting, many were outraged by disregard for the law shown by the 
“guardians of law and order.” Discussion of these incidents was framed as proof that the 
Pakistanis were mercenaries not interested in concerned with maintaining society. In fact, 
they disrupted everyday life and contributed to lawlessness. 
In the context of the unrest, there were obvious political reasons for opposition 
members to distrust and resent anyone they saw as pro-government, but much of the 
resentment of expatriates seemed economically motivated. Nearly every article mentioned 
how expatriates contributed unemployment by taking the vast majority of private sector 
jobs, including high skill, high prestige positions. The Bahrain Center for Human Rights 
presented itself as the champion of expatriate’s rights, but a statement on its website named 
foreigners as a leading cause of unemployment.
197
 In a similar vein, a statement published 
by al-Wifaq described how naturalized citizens occupied top administrative and political 
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posts in many towns and villages.
198 The third writer took the critique further, saying the 
presence of expatriates marginalized the role of citizens in the economy, and made them 
completely dependent on government handouts. The author then called for suspension of 
the huge building projects that brought so many foreigners to the Gulf, “and turn the region 
into a work camp.”
199 All of these articles demonstrated that the opposition supporters felt 
that expatriates received economic benefits that could have gone to citizens. 
EXPATRIATES AS A CULTURAL THREAT 
Several of the articles linked the different classes of expatriate workers. For 
example, an al-Wasat editorial that began by calling on the government to provide more 
jobs for citizens, continued by decrying the unreliability and rebelliousness of expatriate 
housemaids. In fact, many people seem preoccupied by the question of domestic workers. 
One letter the editor called for the imprisonment and deportation of housemaids who ran 
away from their sponsors. Another letter suggests that housemaids who run away become 
prostitutes, thus harming the moral fabric of the country.
200
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This conflation of all social classes of an ethnic group could also be seen in the 
example cited at the beginning of this paper. Rioters angered by the oppression of Pakistani 
and the security forces and expressed their anger by attacking vulnerable Pakistani laborers. 
Members of the Shi’i opposition seemed to see the Sunni royal family, Sunni expatriate 
managers, and Sunni expatriate laborers as a monolith. This was vividly demonstrated by 
the fact that a columnist saw nothing incongruous in discussing the naturalization of foreign 
soldiers in the same paragraph as the problem of runaway domestic workers. The 
government’s stance as a defender of migrants against extremist violence might contribute 
to the impression that all of the Sunnis are one united group. Some reports also indicated 
that expatriate workers participated in pro-government demonstrations, although some 




While the government and its allied newspapers took a positive view of expatriates 
publicly, this did not mean that many of the anxieties and tensions described in the literature 
do not exist in Bahrain. The frequent letters to the editor of the Gulf Daily News about 
runaway or disobedient housemaids, similar to those discussed in the literature on Kuwait 
in the Emirates, suggests that tension between citizens employers and foreign workers were 
                                                          




still very much present.
202
 Another common theme in newspaper coverage was the problem 
of foreign prostitutes and their foreign patrons. Much of the coverage implied that 
prostitution was a problem brought to Bahrain by the influx of foreigners. 
The existing literature on expatriates in the Gulf describes the fear of cultural 
“asianization” and a resulting hostility towards expatriates that does not seem to be present 
in Bahrain’s pro-government media.
203 The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain 
has glossed over some of the other divisions and then society, at least in the press. The 
government in the pro-government media regard expatriates as a useful politically inert 
tool and is a good rhetorical weapon against the opposition and this trumps any discomfort 
of their foreignness. 
Nevertheless, despite their governments praise of the security forces, and its 
championing of expatriate’s rights the government did not publicize how many members 
of the security forces were given citizenship. Even for government supporters, granting 
citizenship to expatriates was controversial. 
AL-WIFAQ’S RESPONSE TO CRITICISM 
Al-Wifaq was aware of the disconnect between its advocacy for the rights of Shi’is 
and its protest against expatriates. The issue of the rights and living conditions of expatriate 
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workers rose to prominence again in January 2013 when a fire at construction workers 
lodgings killed 13 people.
204
 Al-Wifaq issued statements decrying the incident. It argued 
that the death of expatriate workers were symptomatic of the government’s complete 
disregard for human rights, and it called for more frequent inspections and improved safety 
standards, but stated flatly that the authorities have no intention of doing anything to 
improve the situation. The statement also noted that “the vast majority of foreign labor in 
Bahrain lives in villages in areas where antigovernment protest takes place,” so that when 




In one of his sermons, Isa al-Qasim argued that the deaths of Pakistani policeman 
other expatriates in bombings were due to the fact that their service to the government 
places them in harm’s way. He denounced the bombings as “an outrageous oppression,” 
but undercuts his condemnation, by saying “it is justified only by a dirty political interest 
that takes no consideration of religion conscience in the national interest.
206 In his opinion, 
the deaths were inevitable given the security situation the government had created.  
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EXPATRIATES IN POLITICS 
From the government’s perspective, expatriates are a good source of loyal, cheap, 
Sunni labor for the security forces, although this was rarely mentioned. Research by Barany 
and others has emphasized that the successes or failures of the 2011 Arab uprisings were 
largely determined by how loyal security forces might have been to the regime. The 
importance of these security forces cannot be overemphasized. It is reasonable to assume 
that both factions within the Royal family agreed on this point, since regardless of the 
different political views, neither of them wants to be overrun by protesters. The value the 
Bahraini government places on expatriates for their loyalty during the uprising was a 
reversal of previous rulers’ concerns that expatriates might bring destabilizing political 
ideas from their home country. This has resulted in the expulsion of thousands of Yemenis, 
Egyptians and others during the 1950s and 60s. However, after protests in the 1990s, the 
loyalty of Shi’i Bahrainis was considered so suspect that the government relied on 
foreigners. 
This is particularly fascinating given the discourse around the idea of foreign 
interference I have already discussed. Even as the government was warning about possible 
Iranian support for the opposition, it was sponsoring a largely foreign force in its own 
country. Sunni groups pointed this out when they criticized the government for allowing 
American forces to be stationed within Bahrain. In their rhetoric, they compared the U.S. 
forces with the Iranian agents that they believed had also infiltrated the country The 
opposition also seized on this contradiction, and used and concluded their arguments by 
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asserting that the entire Al Khalifa government is foreign, while the only true citizens are 
the Shi’is. 
When they were mentioned and the context and the terms used revealed many 
things about the issues of Bahraini identity at the heart of the current upheaval. For the 
opposition, expatriates represented the coercive force of the government, and also 
symbolized fears that the government was manipulating Bahrain’s demographic situation 
in order to deprive them of the majority that is normally political power. However, 
newspaper articles showed that expatriates were perceived as being at the root of Bahrain’s 
economic inequality. This sentiment combined with hostility to the security forces to create 
a powerful resentment, which was likely expressed in the ongoing attacks against 
expatriates. 
It is important to note here, however, that violence against expatriates, particularly 
Asians, predated the 2011 uprising. They were the target of attacks during the intifada of 
the 1990’s and during labor actions in the 50’s and 60’s. Much more frequently they have 
been the victims of violence perpetrated by their employers, so while much of the most 
recent violence against expatriates was likely motivated by the factors discussed above 
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they were far from the only incidents of violence against expatriates, and the reasons listed 
are far from the only reasons.
207
 
But for the government, expatriates also represented a coercive force, one they 
could rely on not to be caught up in local politics. They also represented an opportunity to 
improve the country’s human rights record in the face of both domestic and international 
criticism, allowing them to at least partially reclaim the issue of human rights, which the 
opposition has made synonymous with Shi’i rights.
208 The attacks on expatriates, in 2011, 
and the bombings in 2013 and 2014 provided them with an opportunity to criticize the 
opposition’s disregard for human rights. 
This is all the more troubling to Bahrainis, because citizenship in the rest of the 
Gulf was largely confined to the descendants of people living in the country at the time of 
independence. The question of citizenship in the Gulf States was linked to issues of tribal 
lineage, which will be discussed the greater link in the next chapter. Things were never 
quite that simple for Bahrain, which was a multiethnic multicultural port city long before 
its independence from Great Britain. Even so, there was a sense among Bahrainis that to 
be a Bahraini is to be an Arab and to trace lineage back to centuries of residence in the 
country. Bahrain’s Shi’i opposition in particular was not comfortable with the more modern 
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definition of citizenship as something that could be granted or removed by the government. 
They based their entire argument for political representation on their place as a majority of 
citizens, so they didn’t wish to see the definition of citizen shift. 
At the same time, the hostility towards expatriates demonstrated by some Shi’is 
threatened their monopoly on the issue of human rights, and gave the government away to 
attack them. The division between the official and unofficial opposition showed in their 
response to this issue. February 14 and similar groups were openly hostile to the security 
forces and, by extension all expatriates.  Al-Wifaq attempted to retain its “human rights,” 
credentials by showing its support for expatriates and attacking the weak points of the 
government’s own record of defending the rights of laborers. 
 As previously mentioned, all of this discussion of human rights is the most part 
intended for an international audience and Bahrain’s labor reforms were positively received 
internationally, while the attacks on expatriates have also received international coverage 
in the attention of groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Al-
Wifaq’s coalition also spent considerable effort in defending its treatment of expatriates 
and accusing the government. February 14 and related groups, on the other hand were blunt 
about their intention to target “foreign mercenaries.” According to their view of the 
conflict, attacking “foreign mercenaries” was perfectly justified. 
The voices missing from all of this discussion were the voices of the expatriates 
themselves. While people from across Bahrain’s political spectrum argued about what 
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expatriates wanted, needed, and deserved, they were not interested in hearing from the 
actual expatriates. 
The discussion of expatriates of Bahrain was inextricably tangled with inclusion 
and identity issues in Bahrain. Because of this rhetorical importance, the issue of 




Chapter 4. Gulf Arab Identity or Bahraini Identity 
In late November 2013, foreign ministers from the five members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Oman – met in Manama to discuss trade and security issues.
209
 The main 
issue on the table was the GCC union, a plan for closer security and economic cooperation 
among the five nations. 
Saudi Arabia had been pursuing union in various forms since the establishment of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1991, but the issue was given new urgency in late 2013 
when a deal between the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and Iran was 
initiated as the GCC began to doubt the United States’ willingness to defend them against 
potential Iranian aggression.
210
 At past GCC summits, delegates had emphasized the 
potential trade and economic benefits of a customs union and a single currency.
211 In 2014, 
however, the focus was clearly on security. 
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At the conclusion of the summit, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar 
Madani said that the GCC nations “must unite under one political entity to face internal 
and external challenges…All countries have realized that blind dependence on a foreign 
power is no longer acceptable. GCC countries must decide their own futures.”
212 Although 
negotiations for union eventually stalled when Oman’s Foreign Minister announced that 
his country was not interested in a security agreement, the foreign ministers agreed to 
continue studying the subject. 
The rupture of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in March 2014 made 
the realization of the Gulf Union, at least in the short-term, less likely.
213 However, 
Bahrain’s Prime Minister and Saudi Arabia’s leaders continued to push for a bilateral union 
between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Al-Wifaq’s coalition also continued to warn against 
the proposed union. 
Coverage of the union plan in both the international and Arab press focused on a 
potential new union between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain because of the already close 
economic and security cooperation between the two kingdoms and because of the 
outspoken popular resistance to the plan.  
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The subtext of all these discussions was that the Gulf Cooperation Council states 
shared not only foreign policy interests, but also a common “Gulf Arab identity.” 
Proponents of the Gulf Union plan argued that because of the shared heritage and common 
tribal links of these countries could and should rely on each other. Al-Wifaq’s coalition 
dismissed the idea of a “Gulf Arab identity” as an excuse for the government to sacrifice 
Bahrain’s sovereignty for forces to suppress the opposition. The February 14 Youth 
Coalition saw the Saudi forces that entered Bahrain as part of the Peninsula Shield Force 
and the Al Khalifa as part of the same Sunni occupation. 
The discussion of the union plan provides ideal forum for contesting questions of 
Bahraini identity and sovereignty, partly because the plan itself is so ill-defined. Bahrain 
government spokesperson Sameera Rajab has described the proposed Union as like the 
European Union.
214 Others, including Bahrain’s Prime Minister, and Saudi Arabia’s 
Foreign Minister envision a much higher degree of coordination, perhaps a confederation 
along lines of the United Arab Emirates, and a very strong defensive element including a 
united GCC military force.
215 One report suggested that the proposed military force could 
consist of about 100,000 troops, with Saudi Arabia contributing 50,000.
216 Many within al-
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Wifaq’s coalition viewed the plan as a Saudi annexation of Bahrain. The uncertainty 
surrounding the union plan gave each political factions the opportunity to interpret it in a 
way that served their rhetorical purposes. 
Saudi Arabia would certainly be the most powerful player in any union. Its 
economy made up more than 45 percent of the total economy of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council.
217 It was also the largest of the GCC States post by geographic size and population. 
It also had the largest oil reserves of any of the GCC States. Saudi Arabia was the main 
force behind the idea from the beginning and was mainly responsible for drawing up the 
plans. 
Bahrain’s Prime Minister was particularly vehement in pushing the GCC Union 
plan, arguing “A united Gulf would enable its people to live in security, peace and 
prosperity.”218 After the inconclusive end to the conference, he outlined his concerns even 
more explicitly, saying “a GCC union is vital to face security threats and political 
challenges…What we want is a union that would move us forward to integration and 
interdependence and provide us with a collective security umbrella.”
219
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It was clear that the Bahraini government was most implicit in developing closer 
coordination with Saudi Arabia, because after Oman rejected the idea of defense 
coordination, Sameera Rajab pointedly noted that union could continue without Oman, and 
“even with only two countries.”
220
 
GULF ARAB IDENTITY, NEO-TRADITIONALISM, AND NATIONALISM 
Although the Prime Minister argued for union in practical terms, others within the 
government presented union as the natural result of the ethnic and cultural ties between the 
GCC countries. Bahrain’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Shaikh Humoud bin Abdullah Al 
Khalifa, described Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as “part of one harmonious family.”
221 
Columnists in the pro-government Akhbar al-Khalij newspaper also presented the idea of 
a Gulf Arab identity as an alternative to the Bahraini nationalism espoused by al-Wifaq.
222 
In his speech during the Manama Summit, King Hamad described the Gulf Union as a 
means to strengthen the region’s “Islamic identity,” a concept that seems remarkably 
similar to the Gulf Arab identity. The speech also mentioned the Gulf nation’s “common 
heritage” The anti-opposition civil society group Citizens for Bahrain outlined the basis for 
a Gulf Arab identity. “Family and tribal links are extended across national boundaries as a 
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result of close historic links across this region. The union project recognizes and celebrates 
this and helps forge a greater sense of collective Gulf citizenship.”
223
 
A presentation by the UAE Identity Authority argued that the main goal of the GCC 
was to “reconstruct identity, principle of single culture and nation [sic],” and to “strengthen 
the collective sense of uniqueness.”
224
 It went on to call for governments to work for 
maintaining this identity. This implied that Gulf Arab identity not only existed now, but 
had always existed. 
Contesting this view, Miriam Cooke described the development of a “tribal 
modern” identity of the Gulf States in the last 30 years.
225 In her view, this identity was a 
brand that invoked tribal heritage to link the modern Gulf States with their tribal origins 
and with each other. Cooke noted that heritage projects and the Gulf States focused on 
reconstructing certain aspects of the Bedouin culture. Since Bedouin tribes ranged across 
most of what are now the Gulf States, this reimagined Bedouin culture was seen as a single 
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Gulf Arab identity. Naturally, selecting this tradition and instituting it as the “heritage” of 
the Gulf States, glossed over the many cultural differences of the Gulf.
226
 
There were close family ties between all of the ruling families of the Gulf, and 
many of Bahrain’s other Sunnis have links with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. However, the 
construction of a Gulf Arab identity on the basis of ethnic ties ignored the fact that 
Bahrain’s Shi’is, as well as the Sunnis of Iranian origin who make up 10 percent of the 
Sunni population, are ethnically distinct.
227
 
Many members of Bahrain’s Royal family highlighted their family ties with Saudi 
Arabia. King Hamad’s second wife was a Saudi princess and several of his sons married 
into the Saudi royal family.
228 His youngest son, Prince Nasser also routinely dressed in 
Saudi, rather than Bahraini traditional dress. This was significant because traditional dress 
was one of the most important and obvious aspects of the “tribal modern.” 
229 Essentially, 
when members of the royal family talked about Gulf Arab identity, they were talking about 
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the identity they themselves embodied. The Bahraini royal family and their close tribal 
allies were the only people in Bahrain who had a tribal heritage. 
In light of this controversy and contestation, King Hamad’s statement in a February 
2012 speech that, “we all came from Zubara together” prompted a strong reaction.230 
Zubara was a city in what is now Qatar that the Al Khalifa ruled before they invaded 
Bahrain. This attempt to smooth over the division in Bahraini society by reinventing history 
so that “we all came from Zubara together,” prompted a scornful response, including a 
satirical video.
231
 The video showed interviews with Bahraini citizens of Indian or 
Pakistani origin to emphasize the impossibility of grouping all Bahrainis together in the 
same category with the Al Khalifa. The attempt to connect all Bahrainis together with the 
identity of the Royal family contrasts sharply with the Shi’i opposition groups’ definition 
of a true Bahraini citizen. February 14 and groups like it trace their legitimacy back to the 
Shi’i society that was in Bahrain before they Al Khalifa invasion. This disconnect was an 
indicator of the divisions that prevent a political solution. 
The moderate faction family remained largely silent on the issue of union. It was 
generally regarded as less pro-Saudi than the hardline faction and less invested in the 
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question of Iranian aggression, and did not support security measures a solution to the 
domestic unrest problem.  
TNGOU supported the union plan in many of its statements, and it organized a pro-
union demonstration during the recent GCC summit to counter an opposition antiunion 
protest. In fact, its support for the plan is part of TNGOU’s manifesto.
232 It described union 
with Saudi Arabia as one of Bahrain’s best defenses against both Iran and “terrorism,” and 
it cited the intervention of the Peninsula Shield Force as an example of the benefits of close 
defense cooperation. The Sunni al-Asala and al-Minbar political societies, which often 
joined TNGOU in criticizing the Shi’is were largely silent on the question of Gulf union. 
The small size of the pro-union protest suggested that many of TNGOU’s supporters and 
allies were not interested in the union question.
233
 
The cultural arguments made by supporters of the Gulf union raised further 
questions, since Bahrain, and the Gulf as a whole was home to many different cultures. 
Recent studies of cultural revivalism in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have noted that the 
museums and cultural events portray the Bedouin culture is the only form of traditional 
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234 The UAE in particular promoted newly created “traditional” events such as 
camel racing and televised Nabati poetry competitions.
235 Although the Al Khalifa came 
from a Bedouin background, originating in the Najaf region of Saudi Arabia, this nomadic 
culture was never prominent in Bahrain, where society was traditionally based on 
agriculture, fishing, and trade.236 Therefore, the conception of the Gulf Arab identity 
implicitly excluded Bahrain Shi’i population, which lacked both the ethnic and cultural ties 
that are privileged by the idea of Gulf Arabs as a community.
237
 
The royal families of the Gulf States come from similar ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds and comprise this identity, which was being put forward as a Gulf identity. 
This emphasis on common heritage and identity caused some online commenters to 
question whether a GCC union would put Bahrain and the other Gulf states under the 
authority of Saudi Arabian law, which is stricter particularly on social issues than the laws 
and the rest of the Gulf. However, Saudi Arabia repeatedly insisted that union would not 
lead Saudi Arabia to interfere in any of its neighbors domestic affairs.
238
 An al-Wasat 
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article cast scorn on the idea of a Gulf Arab identity noting that Bahrain is home to many 
different cultures, including some non-Arab ones.
239 A column for the al-Wasat newspaper 
wondered how anyone could form a political framework that would link the constitutional 
monarchies of Kuwait in Bahrain with the more conservative monarchies of Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and Oman. The columnists feared that the more liberal states would be forced to 
become more conservative and in the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia.
240
 
These concerns highlighted the cultural differences between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain. Many Bahrainis pride themselves on their modernism and development as well 
as their multicultural heritage especially in contrast with their neighbors. This laid-back 
image also proved very profitable for Bahrain as it is a destination for Saudi and Western 
businessmen looking to relax.
241
 
The Gulf Union plan was also proposed as an alternative to foreign interference, 
both by providing Bahrain with a shield against Iran and by freeing Bahrain from its 
dependence on US military support. Unsurprisingly, opposition groups and others who 
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disapproved of the involvement of the Peninsula Shield Force in the suppression of the 
2011 protests argued that joining a GCC union would replace the threat of Iranian 
interference with the certainty of Saudi interference. 
THE OPPOSITION, BAHRAINI NATIONALISM, AND GULF UNION 
It is not surprising that al-Wifaq’s coalition and February 14 were opposed to the 
Gulf Union plan, particularly since it viewed Saudi Arabia as allied with the royal family 
against them. It assumed that the projected Gulf Union Army would be deployed against 
them, just as the Peninsula Shield Force was used to clear the Pearl Roundabout. Many 
within the opposition also viewed the effort as an attempt by Saudi Arabia to annex Bahrain 
and the royal family’s push for the union as an attempt to drown Bahrain Shi’i majority in 
the Sunni population of Saudi Arabia. Al-Wifaq’s statements referred to the union plan as 
a “bilateral union,” that is, a union between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, regarding the other 
Gulf States as insignificant. 
Al-Wifaq’s coalition’s argument against the union focused on Bahrain’s 
sovereignty. A statement by al-Wifaq noted that Bahrain gained its sovereignty in 1971 
after a popular referendum under the auspices of the United Nations, and that the royal 
family was attempting to relinquish their sovereignty without consulting the citizens. “The 
people -not Khalifa’s [sic] gained the independence and it is only the people of Bahrain 
who has the right to talk about independence, and no one has the right even Al Khalifas- 




242 Al-Wifaq’s Secretary-General Ali Salman called for a popular referendum on 
GCC union, presumably confident that the referendum would reject it. 
 During the December 2014 Manama Summit, al-Wifaq and its allies organized 
protests attended by at least 10,000 people.
243 One statement argued that this protests was 
the equivalent of a popular referendum and shows that the people were against the idea. 
Another statement noted that there was opposition to the Gulf Union plan in many of 
Bahrain’s neighbors. “We are rejecting this union for the same reasons the Omanis, Qataris, 
Kuwaitis and Emiratis are rejecting it.” 
244 the statement argued that each country had its 
own distinct national identity, and each country wanted its sovereignty. 
These arguments were in line with the general Bahraini nationalist tone of al-Wifaq 
statements, and they were designed to appeal to those who were implicitly excluded from 
the idea of “Gulf Arab identity,” which implies Sunni faith, Arab ethnicity, and the tribal 
background. These Bahraini nationalist arguments were likely to find an audience in 
                                                          
242 Al-Wifaq, "All the Forms Planned for the Union Are Merely of 'Wasting the Independence,'" news 
release, May 14, 2012, accessed March 4, 2014, http://alWifaq.net/cms/2012/05/14/6469/. 
243 Al-Wifaq claims there were more than 30,000. Al-Wifaq, "300,000 Bahrainis Protest against the 
Bilateral Union," news release, May 19, 2012, accessed March 4, 2014, 
http://alWifaq.net/cms/2012/05/19/6487/. 
244 Al-Wifaq, "300,000 Bahrainis Protest against the Bilateral Union," news release, May 19, 2012, 
accessed March 4, 2014, http://alWifaq.net/cms/2012/05/19/6487/. 
 
 106 
Bahrain, since the citizens demonstrated their independence when they rejected the idea of 
becoming one of the United Arab Emirates or Iran in its 1971 popular referendum.
245
 
The 1971 referendum was an important symbol for al-Wifaq’s coalition because it 
was one of the few occasions of cross-sectarian Bahraini unity. It demonstrated that citizens 
saw themselves as Bahrainis, rather than Iranians or Emiratis. Al-Wifaq argued for a 
Bahraini nationalist identity, but this was one of the few events in Bahraini history that had 
the same symbolic importance for both sects. Another important event for Bahraini 
nationalist identity was the approval of the National Action Charter in 2001. Both of these 
events were important points of reference for al-Wifaq’s coalition, and were frequently 
mentioned in their statements. Al-Wifaq’s coalition also considered the beginning of the 
uprising at the Pearl Roundabout as a manifestation of Bahraini nationalism. Furthermore, 
the al-Wifaq’s arguments implied that the royal family’s willingness and eagerness to 
relinquish Bahrain’s sovereignty, for the sake of security and power, demonstrated the need 
for political reform. 
If al-Wifaq’s coalition was concerned by the potential defense cooperation that the 
new plan implies, they are skeptical of its proposed economic benefits. The al-Wasat 
newspaper notes that after the formation of the Gulf Cooperative Council the standard of 
living of Bahrainis, particularly the Shi’is, decreased, and questioned whether the Shi’is 
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would benefit from any of the potential economic opportunities.
246 One article also noted 
that although the Gulf Union plan has been under consideration for almost 15 years, very 
little progress had been made.
247
 Sarcastically, the author asked whether a government that 
could leave citizens stranded for decades on the waiting list for government housing could 
organize something as massive as a transnational union. He concluded that the idea of a 
Gulf Union was unrealistic given the lack of progress on the GCC’s other coordination 
projects, but that many of its supporters were still fighting for it  
Another columnist argued that the foreign policy interests of the Gulf States were 
far too divergent to make a union successful.
248 He noted that both Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain have concerns about Iranian expansionism, while their neighbors are far less 
concerned with it. He concluded that a Saudi Arabia-Bahrain union was possible but that a 
larger union was unlikely.
249 A final opinion piece argued that the proposed union was just 
a cloak for Saudi expansionist plans.
250 The author said that Saudi Arabia revealed its lack 
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of true “Gulf Arab brotherly” sentiments by “waging war against the Sultanate of Oman” 
because of Oman’s opposition to the union plan.  
Many of these articles suggested that whatever ties bound the Gulf states together 
they were not strong enough to overcome their social, cultural, and political differences. 
They were also not strong enough to overcome government incompetence. These articles 
assumed that the union would not be successful. Other articles that view the entire process 
of a Saudi Arabia in expansionist plot thought that the effort might succeed. While Gulf 
Arab identity was too weak to form the basis of a union, these writers assumed that Saudi 
Arabia’s ambition was nearly all-powerful. 
Statements and social media postings issued by the February 14 Youth Coalition 
largely ignored the entire issue of Gulf Union. However, February 14 denounced the royal 
family for inviting the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force into Bahrain to put down the uprising. 
They described this as the “Saudi occupation” and announced their intention to resist it.
251
 
GULF UNION AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Regardless of the feasibility of the plan, the discussions of a GCC union provided 
the royal family, their supporters, and the opposition the opportunity to express their views 
on the nature of Bahraini, sovereignty and identity. In general it seems that Bahrainis, 
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whether they have pro-government or opposition sympathies assumed that any possible 
union would be a close and that political and military organization more along the lines of 
the United Arab Emirates and the European Union. Their support or opposition to the plan 
is largely determined by whether they consider Iran a serious threat to Bahrain. This, in 
turn, was determined by whether they consider Iran to be behind Bahrain’s domestic unrest. 
Many, if not most, government supporters appeared to believe this. Therefore, they saw 
stopping Iranian interference as Bahrain’s number one priority and relinquishing some of 
Bahrain’s sovereignty was a small price to pay for security. Importantly, the vast majority 
of government supporters were Sunni Arabs who would have close ethnic and cultural ties 
with Riyadh, and were more likely to see themselves as having a Gulf Arab identity. 
Those who believed that Bahrain’s domestic protest movement was a legitimate 
expression of popular will viewed Saudi Arabia as the enemy, brought in by an illegitimate 
government to suppress its own people. Anyone who held this view was likely to regard 
the Iranian threat as overblown, if not completely imaginary, and to view Saudi Arabia as 
Bahrain’s real enemy. On this basis, the Shi’i opposition strenuously resisted union. The 
issue of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Bahrain and Iran’s relationship with Bahrain went 
directly to the heart of the conflict between the government and its supporters and the 
opposition.  
None of the political groups seemed to consider the union likely to succeed. 
Attempts to institute a customs union in a single currency had made no progress at the time 
of writing. Even if the current diplomatic breaches were healed, political union of along 
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the lines of that outlined by Bahraini Prime Minister would be far more complex and 
contentious. 
Nevertheless, the issues brought to the surface by the discussion of union remain. 
Even the currently the independent Bahrain is dependent on Saudi Arabia’s economic 
subsidies, and in the current crisis it has also been dependent on Saudi Arabic for troops to 
suppress the uprising. As long as Bahrainis had the royal family Saudi Arabia’s support, it 
was almost certain to remain in power, since the Saudis had the resources to prop them up 
them indefinitely, but by the same token the more Bahrain relied on Saudi support the more 
they become dependent on their neighbor for the last real power they had. Given the close 
ties between the royal houses, this shift might not have seemed momentous to the Al 




The government supported the concept of Gulf Arab identity as an alternative to 
the opposition’s varying conceptions of Bahraini identity. The Gulf Arab identity was 
based on a reimagining of Bedouin tradition, and the royal family and their closest tribal 
allies came from this tradition. Therefore, the royal family was suggesting that its own 
identity represent a new kind of Bahraini identity. The Shi’i opposition, both al-Wifaq’s 
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All of the groups I studied for this project would have considered themselves to 
Bahraini nationalists, but they each had a different conception of what it meant to be 
Bahraini. The discourse on this issue of Bahraini identity has coalesced around four 
different issues: national dialogue, terrorism, expatriates, and the GCC union. The different 
ways that groups within the royal family, the Shi’i opposition, and Sunni groups conceived 
of these issues, divided them. 
The moderate opposition coalition, led by al-Wifaq, argued that members all 
religious sects were equally citizens of Bahrain and that the citizens were equal with the 
royal family. Although al-Wifaq often criticized the government, it never explicitly argued 
it was illegitimate. Therefore, al-Wifaq staked its reputation on a political solution through 
the national dialogue. The national dialogue was also supported by a moderate faction 
within the royal family. This faction, led by Crown Prince Salman, admitted that at least 
some members of the opposition were “true citizens” with real concerns. Therefore, the 
national dialogue with the opposition made sense to them.  
In the view of the royal family’s conservative faction, however, the opposition was 
entirely made up of foreign agents. Therefore, the national dialogue was essentially a 
“negotiation with terrorists.” The Sunni opposition agreed with this sentiment and felt that 
since they were the true citizens, having demonstrated their loyalty by supporting the 
government during the uprising they should have been the ones who rewarded by the 
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government. They feared that the national dialogue would result in concessions, the Shi’is 
being rewarded for the disloyal behavior.  
The February 14 Youth Coalition, and groups similar to it in the unofficial 
opposition, argued that the government was illegitimate and the Shi’i revolutionaries were 
the “true citizens.” For this reason, they were not interested in the negotiations. The 
hostility that the royal family’s conservatives, the Sunni opposition, and the unofficial 
opposition felt toward the national dialogue proved a major obstacle to its negotiations.  
One of the most commonly discussed issues was “terrorism,” and this discussion 
centered on who had the right to use violence. The royal family made it clear that it had a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and it argued that anyone else who committed 
an act of violence had to be a foreign agent. Thus, in discussions of the national dialogue, 
the royal family was divided as to whether there was a legitimate opposition made up of 
true Bahraini citizens, once the discourse on terrorism started dominate after the Riffa 
bombing the royal family seemed united in depicting the opposition as a militant foreign-
backed terrorist organization. Sunni groups were even harsher in their condemnation of the 
“terrorist” activity, and demanded that the government stamp it out. February 14 held the 
opposite view, seeing their members as “true citizens” fighting for their freedom against 
the Al Khalifas’ foreign occupation. Al-Wifaq found itself in a difficult position since it 
supported the legitimacy of both of these groups. In general, it settled for condemning 




Throughout the discussions, al-Wifaq maintained the broadest definition of 
Bahraini citizenship, as part of its effort to gather support. It claimed that both Sunnis and 
Shi’is were true citizens. At the same time, however, it vigorously opposed the granting of 
citizenship to expatriates, which it described as “demographic engineering.” Although al-
Wifaq said was not hostile to expatriates, it did not believe they could or should become 
Bahrainis. Like most citizens the Gulf, al-Wifaq’s leaders saw expatriates as merely a 
temporary presence. February 14 was actively hostile to expatriates because it saw them 
only as the mercenaries of the illegitimate government. 
The government and the government supporters saw expatriates as useful tools for 
suppressing unrest, even arguing that the foreigners could be more loyal than so-called 
citizens. Nevertheless, it was unwilling to discuss its naturalization policies, and most 
expatriates had no chance at gaining citizenship. 
Identity was most explicitly discussed in the context of the GCC union. Bahrain’s 
Royal family promotes the idea on the grounds of “Gulf Arab identity.” However, the entire 
Shi’i opposition, al-Wifaq’s official coalition and the unofficial opposition denied that 
Bahrain had a “Gulf Arab identity.” Gulf countries have constructed an identity from their 
idea of a traditional culture based on the tribal links that unite much of the Gulf. Bahrain’s 
royal family was part of this tribal network, but Bahrain Shi’is were not. For this reason, 
al-Wifaq described the idea of GCC union as a betrayal of Bahrain’s unique identity. It did 
not want this identity to be swallowed up in the identity of the Gulf as a whole. 
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While an analysis of political statements revealed these views on identity, it also 
showed that the sentiments of the various political groups shifted according to political 
strategy. In general, al-Wifaq emphasized a nationalist secular Bahraini identity rather than 
a Shi’i identity, but in the discussion of the naturalization of Sunni expatriates or the Gulf 
Union it highlighted Bahrain’s Shi’i character to make its point. Similarly, al-Wifaq 
promoted the idea of nonviolent protest, but faced with the growing popularity of February 
14 it backed the use of violence for self-defense and did not directly criticize February 14’s 
tactics. 
Another pressure that influenced the views expressed in these statements was the 
pressure of international opinion. As nationalist as Bahraini political groups and their 
platforms were, all of these groups were also keenly aware of international opinion, and 
they tried to manipulate it. The violence in Bahrain’s streets was mainly discussed the 
context of terrorism, with an eye to the “global war on terror.” When justifying its harsher 
terrorism laws and its prosecution of “terrorists” Bahrain’s government was eager to link 
them to international terrorist groups. Similarly, opposition groups gained international 
attention for their discussion of human rights abuses, and Bahrain’s government showcased 
its own progress on rights for expatriate workers and criticized the treatment of expatriates 
by the opposition. The Sunni opposition also criticized the opposition internationally and 
it made the case that the Sunnis were the true “democratic opposition” while the Shi’i 
opposition was a dangerous terrorist group. 
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Recent political developments in the Gulf have been understudied, but the current 
heritage revival movements in the UAE and Qatar suggest that many of the Gulf States are 
dealing with similar questions of national identity. The impact of these national identity 
issues and political developments deserves study. For Bahrain, a detailed political survey 
could help determine whether the views expressed in the political statements and 
newspaper opinion pieces I examined reflected the attitudes of Bahrainis in general. The 
unrest and uncertainty in Bahrain gives scholars an opportunity to re-examine our 
assumptions about the Gulf and its politics. I hope that this study contributes to this 
discussion. 
The uprising in Bahrain tends to be discussed in terms of the sectarian divide. While 
this was clearly a major factor in the definition of Bahraini identity, this study shows that 
it was not the only factor that defined identity. Sectarianism was not the only factor that 
divided political groups from one another. In fact, some political groups such al-Wifaq’s 
coalition attempted to transcend the sectarian issue. Bahrain’s political groups were divided 
by their conception of what it meant to be Bahraini. As each group demanded rights for 
citizens, they disagreed on conceptualizations of citizenship. Similarly, denying that their 
opponents were “true citizens,” allowed each group to delegitimize views they disagreed 
with. Looking at Bahrain from purely an issue of sectarianism obscures many of the other 
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